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Chapter 1
Introduction
People’s preferences have some stable features. When making decisions
involving time, we are usually impatient: we seek for immediate gratification, and
care less about future outcomes. Sometimes, we do not appreciate the urge to pursue
immediate gratification. We make plans for the future, but disappointedly, fail to stick
to them when the time is approaching. There are always things that we know we should
do, but never do. It appears that our impatience is not constant, but stronger when
the time is nearer: impatience declines over time.
In decisions under risk, we tend to overweight events that happen with very small
probabilities, and underweight events that happen with intermediate and large proba-
bilities. We also have stronger preference for avoiding losses to acquiring gains. This
tendency of loss aversion is not just for huge stakes like life or your house, but also for
stakes as small as 10 dollars. Imagine a person is going to toss a fair coin, if it is tails,
you lose $10. How much would you have to gain on winning in order for this gamble
to be acceptable to you? A lot of people will ask for more than $20.
Preferences are also adaptable. Although in general we prefer sooner rewards
than later, the degree to which delayed rewards are discounted, and the impatience
changes, varies across domains. Imagine losing weight in a healthy way, we are recom-
mended to do both physical exercise and dieting. For some people, it is easier to stick
to gym plans than to dieting; for others, it is the opposite. It seems that our mental
strength and self-control do not have the same power for every aspect in life, but differ
across domains. Similarly, decisions under risk are susceptible to context. The same
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person could prefer "In a group of 600 people, 200 people will be saved" over "1/3
probability of saving all 600 people" and at the same time prefer "2/3 probability that
600 people will all die" over "In a group of 600 people, 400 will die", despite that the
two sets of choices are essentially the same.
This dissertation addresses both the stability side, and the adaptivity side of deci-
sions over time and under risk. Because of the stable features of preferences, we could
use the same models and functions to describe preferences in different domains and
under different context. The first two chapters are dealing with the measurements of
time discounting and risk attitudes. Also, because preferences are adaptable, we should
bear in mind that conclusions on one kind of outcomes or from one specific context
cannot be directly applied to all outcomes or scenarios. In the latter three chapters we
explore the richness of preference adaptivity.
Chapter 2: How to measure discounting reliably and easily?
As the most widely used model to analyze intertemporal choices, Discounted Utility
evaluates future outcomes by their utility weighted by a discount factor. The existing
methods to measure discounting either make the questionable assumption that utility
in risky choices is the same as utility in riskless intertemporal choices, or use complex
methods to elicit utility and discounting at the same time, and are therefore susceptible
to collinearity between utility and discounting.
This chapter presents a tractable method to measure discounting that requires no
knowledge of utilities, because they cancel out. The cancelling out of utilities requires
a critical assumption: time separability, which means that what you had in the past
and what you will have in the future do not affect the utility of what you have now.
Since this assumption is violated sometimes (imagine that the utility of your lunch
might be affected by what you ate in the morning and what you will eat for dinner),
we tested it in the experiment, and found that separability holds for most people under
our context. We also compared our results with a traditional, utility based method
introduced by Epper et al. (2011). We found that our method needs fewer questions
but gives similar results.
Chapter 3: Is Prelec’s probability weighting function reliable?
Prelec’s (1998) compound-invariant family provides an appealing way to model
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probability weighting and is widely used in empirical studies. Prelec (1998) gave a be-
havioral foundation for this function, however, this condition is hard to test empirically
as it requires a lot of indifference. Luce (2001) proposed a simpler condition: reduction
invariance, which is easier to test empirically.
In this chapter, reduction invariance is tested in a lab experiment. The data support
reduction invariance both at aggregate level and at individual level where reduction in-
variance was the dominant pattern. The descriptive validity of the compound-invariant
weighting function is confirmed. In latter chapters, we use Prelec’s function to analyze
risky choices.
Chapter 4: Do people discount health and money differently?
Both individuals and governments make decisions involving outcomes that occur
at different points in time. Examples are choosing a pension plan, purchasing durable
goods and funding scientific projects. Constant discounting is usually assumed, due to
its traceability and normative appeal, although it is not frequently observed in reality.
Loosely speaking, a person who discounts constantly will get up in the morning when
the alarm clock set by herself wakes her up, and goes to gym at the frequency she
planned when paying for the membership. In addition, it is still unclear whether health
and money should be discounted similarly. Policy implications require more accurate
descriptions on people’s time preferences.
This chapter measures deviations from constant discounting for health and money.
Our method allows to compare the degree of decreasing impatience between the two
domains. The results indicate that most subjects deviated from constant discounting
and were decreasingly impatient for both money and health. Further, this deviation is
larger for health than for money.
Chapter 5: Does money make you irrational?
Money plays a significant role in people’s lives. Our social preferences and individual
behaviors change when we are around money. Vohs and Schooler (2008) has shown
that people who are exposed to money suddenly become less helpful than those who
aren’t. Kouchaki et al. (2013) showed that people are more likely to lie or make immoral
decisions after being exposed to money-related words. Prelec and Simester (2001) found
that consumers’ willingness to pay decreases substantially when using cash instead of
3
credit cards. In this chapter, we investigate if holding cash influences people’s risk
attitudes.
In an experiment, we studied simple lottery valuation tasks, and implemented two
treatments: number and cash. In the number treatment, the outcomes of lotteries
were denoted by numbers. In the cash treatment, the lottery outcomes were presented
with real cash and subjects were asked to value the lotteries with real notes and coins.
Subjects in the cash treatment gave lower valuations than those in the number treat-
ment: they were more risk averse. By fitting our data to Prelec’s probability weighting
function, we conclude that cash makes people less sensitive to probability changes, but
has no effect on pessimism.
Chapter 6: Are black swans really ignored?
There are two kinds of uncertainties in life. For the first type, you have information
sources like weather forecasts, drug-package inserts, and mutual fund brochures, all of
which provide descriptions of possible outcomes (rainy or sunny, various complications,
potential profits) and probabilities. For the second, you have no summary descriptions
of possible outcomes or their likelihoods, such as whether to go out on a date, when to
pass a truck on the highroad, or to take part in dangerous sports or not. For the later
events, you have to rely on your own encounters with different occasions, and make
decisions from experience (DFE).
Hertwig et al. (2004) and a lot of studies after them found that DFE and deci-
sions from descriptions (DFD) can lead to dramatically different choice behaviors. In
particular, under DFE, people seem to ignore events that happen with small probabil-
ities, which is opposite to DFD. This chapter explores the DFE-DFD gap by resolving
problems in former studies, which enables us to observe the genuine weightings of prob-
abilities. Overall, our findings suggest a clear de-biasing effect of sampling experience:
it attenuates - rather than reverses - the commonly found inverse-S shaped probability
weighting in DFD.
4
Chapter 2
Measuring Discounting without
Measuring Utility
Discounted utility is the most widely used model to analyze intertemporal decisions.
It evaluates future outcomes by their utility weighted by a discount factor. Measur-
ing discount factors is difficult because they interact with utility. Most measurements
simply assume that utility is linear 1, which is unsatisfactory for many economic appli-
cations. Frederick et al. (2002, p.382), therefore, suggested measuring utility through
risky choices while assuming expected utility, as in Chapman (1996b), and then to
use these utilities to measure discount factors. In the health domain, this method had
been used before for flow (continuous) variables (Stiggelbout et al., 1994). In economics,
Andersen et al. (2008) and Takeuchi (2011) used this method for discrete outcomes.
The aforementioned method has two limitations. First, expected utility is often
violated (Starmer, 2000), which distorts utility measurements. Second, the transfer of
risky cardinal utility to riskless intertemporal choice is controversial (Raiffa and Luce,
1957, p.32 Fallacy 3; Camerer, 1995, p.619; Moscati,2013;). Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012b) and Abdellaoui et al. (2013) provided empirical evidence against such a trans-
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Arthur Attema, Han
Bleichrodt, Zhenxing Huang and Peter P. Wakker. Online appendix can be accessed through:
https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/files/1466.pdf
1See Warner and Pleeter (2001), Frederick et al. (2002, p.381),Tanaka et al. (2010), Sutter et al.
(2013).
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fer. When introducing discounted utility, Samuelson (1937; last paragraph) immedi-
ately warned that cardinal intertemporal utility may differ from other kinds of cardinal
utility. To avoid these two difficulties, some studies elicited both utility and discounting
from intertemporal choices (Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a,b;
Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2015). Such elicitations are complex
and susceptible to collinearities between utility and discounting.
This paper presents a tractable method to measure discounting that requires no
knowledge of utility. We adapt a recently introduced method for flow variables in health
(Attema et al., 2012) to discrete monetary outcomes in economics. Flow variables, such
as quality of life, are continuous in time and are consumed per time unit. Whereas
theoretical economic studies sometimes take money as a flow variable, experimental
studies of discounting invariably take it as discrete, received at discrete timepoints,
and we will do so here. Because our method directly measures discounting, and utility
plays no role, we call it the direct method (DM).
The basic idea of the DM is as follows. Assume that a decision maker is indifferent
between: (a) an extra payment of $10 per week during weeks 1-30; and (b) the same
extra payment during weeks 31-65. Then the total discount weight of weeks 1-30 is
equal to that of weeks 31-65. We can derive the entire discount function from such
equalities. Knowledge of utility is not required because it drops from the equations.
Even though this method is elementary, it has not been known before.
The DM is easy to implement and subjects can easily understand it. In an experi-
ment, we compare it with a traditional, utility based, method (UM). In our comparison,
we use the implementation of the UM by Epper et al. (2011, EFB henceforth), which
is based on prospect theory, currently the most accurate descriptive theory of risky
choice. We show that the DM needs fewer questions than the UM but gives similar
results.
2.1 Theory
We assume a preference relation< over discrete outcome streams (x1,...,xT ), yielding
outcome (money amount) xj at time tj, for each j ≤ T . For ease of presentation, we
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consider the stimuli used in our experiment, where T = 52 and the unit of time is one
week. Thus (x1,...,x52) yields xj at the end of week j, for each j. Discounted utility
holds if preferences maximize the discounted utility of outcome stream x:
52∑
j=1
djU(xj) (2.1)
Here, U is the subjective utility function, which is strictly increasing and satisfies
U(0) = 0, and 0 < dj is the subjective discount factor of week j. For E ⊂ {1, ..., 52},
αEβ denotes the outcome stream that gives outcome α at all timepoints in E and out-
come β at all other timepoints. C(E) denotes the cumulative sum
∑
j∈E dj and reflects
the total time weight of E. C(k) denotes C ({ 1, ..., k }). C is called the cumulative
(discount) weight . The proof of the following result clarifies why we do not require
utility: it drops from the equations.
OBSERVATION 1. Assume discounted utility, and α > β. Then:
αAβ  αBβ ⇔
∑
j∈A
dj >
∑
j∈B
dj (i.e., C(A) > C(B)); (2.2)
αAβ ∼ αBβ ⇔
∑
j∈A
dj =
∑
j∈B
dj (i.e., C(A) = C(B)); (2.3)
αAβ ≺ αBβ ⇔
∑
j∈A
dj <
∑
j∈B
dj (i.e., C(A) < C(B)); (2.4)
PROOF. The preference and two inequalities in Eq.2.2 are each equivalent to
C(A)(U(α)− U(β)) + C({1, ..., 52})U(β) > C(B)(U(α)− U(β)) + C({1, ..., 52})U(β).
The other results follow from similar derivations.
Using Observation 1, we can derive equalities of sums of djs, which, in turn, define
the function C on {1, ..., 52} and all the djs. This procedure does not require any
knowledge of utility and is therefore called the direct method (DM).
In the mathematical analysis, we also consider a continuous extension of C, defined
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on all of (0, 52], and also called the cumulative (discount) weight. At the timepoints
1, ..., 52 it agrees with C defined above. In the continuous extension, any payoff xj
is a salary received during week j. Receiving a salary of xj per week during week j
amounts to receiving xj at time j. We equate j with (j − 1, j] here. Salary can also
be received during part of a week. In the continuous extension, C(t)U(α) is the sub-
jective value of receiving α during period (0, t], where C(t) = C(0, t] and t may be a
noninteger, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Then C(t, 52] = C(0, 52] − C(0, t] also for nonintegers t. In
all the empirical estimations reported later, we extend C from integers to nonintegers
using linear interpolations. Given the small time interval of a week, a piecewise linear
approximation is satisfactory. The following remark shows that the djs serve as dis-
cretized approximations of the derivative of C.
REMARK 2. d(j) = C(j) − C(j − 1) is the average of the derivative C ′ over the
interval (j − 1, j]. Thus, dj is approximately C ′(t) at t = j.
2.2 Measuring discounting using the Direct Method
We now explain how C can be measured up to any degree of precision using the
DM. Of course, C(0) = 0. We normalize C(52) = d1 + ... + d52 = 1. We write
cp = C
−1(p). Then c0 = 0 and c1 = 52. We take any α > 0 and measure c 1
2
such
that α(0,c 1
2
]0 ∼ α(c 1
2
,52]0. By Observation 1, C((0, c 1
2
]) = C((c 1
2
, 52]) = 1
2
. Once we
know c 1
2
, we can measure c 1
4
and c 3
4
by eliciting indifferences α(0,c 1
4
]0 ∼ α(c 1
4
,c 1
2
]0 and
α(c 1
2
,c 3
4
]0 ∼ α(c 3
4
,52]0. It follows that C(c 1
4
) = 1
4
and C(c 3
4
) = 3
4
. In general, we measure
subjective midpoints s of time intervals (q, t] by eliciting indifferences α(q,s]β ∼ α(s,t]β
(α > β). By doing this repeatedly, we can measure the cumulative function C to any
desired degree of precision. We can then derive the discount factors from C.
The DM assumes discounted utility. Its most critical property is separability : a
preference (x1, ..., x52) < (y1, ..., y52) with a common outcome xi = yi = c is not
affected if this common outcome is replaced by another common outcome xi = yi = c′.
By repeated application, preference then is independent of any number of common
outcomes.
8
The next proposition shows that the DM permits a simple test of separability, which
we implemented in our experiment. The proposition holds for any outcome α > 0 and,
more generally, for any pair of outcomes α > β with β instead of 0. The proof is in the
appendix.
PROPOSITION 3. Under weak ordering and separability, we must have:
(i) α(c 1
4
,c 1
2
]0 ∼ α(c 1
2
,c 3
4
]0;
(ii) α(0,c 1
4
]0 ∼ α(c 3
4
,52]0.
2.3 The traditional utility-based method (UM)
Our experiment compares the DM with a traditional utility(-based) method (UM),
replicating the implementation by EFB. We first measured prospect theory’s utility
function from elicited certainty equivalents of 20 risky options. Next, we measured the
money amount λ such that
9030 ∼ λj0, (2.5)
where λj0 stands for receiving λ at time (week) j and 0 at all other times. Unlike the
DM, the UM only involves one-time payments. We chose 9030 (and avoided time 0)
to have stimuli similar to those of the DM. Using the measured utility function U and
Eq.2.1 (discounted utility), we derive from Eq.2.5:
duj
du3
=
U(90)
U(λ)
(2.6)
Here duj is the discrete utility based discount factor of week j. We usually normalized
du3 = 1.
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2.4 Experiment
2.4.1 Subjects:
We recruited 104 students (61% male; median age 21), mostly economics or finance
bachelors, from Erasmus University Rotterdam. The experiment was run at the Econ-
Lab of Erasmus School of Economics. The data were collected in five sessions. Seven
subjects gave erratic answers2 and their data were excluded from the analyses.
2.4.2 Incentives:
Each subject was paid a e5 participation fee immediately after the experiment. In
addition, we randomly selected (by bingo machine) one subject in each session and
then one of his choices to be played out for real. The selections were made in public.
We transferred the amount won to the subject’s bank account at the dates specified
in the outcome streams. In the DM, subjects made choices between streams of money.
Consequently, if one of the DM questions was played out for real, we made bank
transfers during several weeks. The five subjects who played for real earned e290 on
average. Over the whole group, the average payment per subject was e18.70.
2.4.3 procedure:
The experiment was computerized. Subjects sat in cubicles to avoid interactions.
They could ask questions at any time during the experiment. The experiment took 45
minutes on average. The first part of the experiment consisted of the DM questions, and
the second and third part consisted of the UM questions. Subjects could only start
each part after they had correctly answered two comprehension questions. Training
questions familiarized subjects with the stimuli.
2Debriefings revealed that at least two of these subjects ignored all future payoffs because they had
no bank account.
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2.4.4 Stimuli: part 1
Part 1 consisted of five questions to measure discounting using the DM and two
questions to test separability. To measure discounting, we elicited c 1
2
, c 1
4
, c 3
4
, c 1
8
, and
c 7
8
from the following indifferences:
α(0,c 1
2
]0 ∼ α(c 1
2
,52]0, α(0,c 1
4
]0 ∼ α(c 1
4
,c 1
2
]0,
α(c 1
2
,c 3
4
]0 ∼ α(c 3
4
,52]0, α(0,c 1
8
]0 ∼ α(c 1
8
,c 1
4
]0, and α(c 3
4
,c 7
8
]0 ∼ α(c 7
8
,52]0.
(2.7)
To test separability, we measured the indifferences in Proposition 3.
Each question was presented as a choice list in which subjects chose between two
options, A and B, in each row. Figure 2.1 displays a screen that subjects faced. In
the first choice (first row), B dominates A. Moving down the list, A becomes more
attractive and in the final choice A dominates B. The computer enforced monotonicity:
After a choice A [B], the computer automatically selected A [B] for all rows below
[above], A [B] being more attractive there. Thus, there was a unique switch from B to
A between two values. We took the indifference value as the midpoint between these
two values. In Figure 2.1, which measures c 1
8
for a subject who had c 1
4
= 13, the
subject switched between 5 and 6 weeks and the indifference value was therefore 5.5.
Figure 2.1: Choice list for the DM elicitation
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We only used integer-week periods as stimuli to keep the choices simple. Hence,
we could not always use the indifference values in subsequent questions and we had to
make rounding assumptions. We rounded values below 26 weeks upwards (e.g., 5.5 to
6 weeks), and values above 26 weeks downwards (e.g., 35.5 to 35 weeks) in subsequent
choices. Details of our rounding and analyses are in the appendix and online appendix.
Our conclusions remained the same under different rounding assumptions, with one
exception mentioned later. After each choice list, we asked a control question (explained
in Online Appendix WA3).
2.4.5 Stimuli: part 2
Part 2 consisted of seven questions of the type A = 9030 ∼ λj0 = B with weeks j
= 4, 12, 20, 28, 36, 44, and 52. Following EFB, we kept the early outcome in Option
A constant and varied the gain λ in Option B (Figure 2.2). As in part 1, the computer
enforced monotonicity. EFB only used the timepoints 1 day, 2 months + 1 day, and
4 months + 1 day. We changed these to obtain more detailed measurements and to
facilitate comparison with our DM measurements.
Figure 2.2: Choice list for the UM elicitation
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2.4.6 Stimuli: part 3
We elicited the certainty equivalents (CE) of twenty risky prospects, shown in Table
2.1, to measure prospect theory’s utility function. The CE choice lists appeared in
random order. They consisted of choices between sure amounts (option B) and risky
prospects (option A) yielding x1 with probability p and x2 < x1 otherwise. We used a
choice list in which the sure amount that B offered decreased from x1 in the first row
to x2 in the final row. We used the prospects in EFB with all amounts multiplied by
10 (to get amounts similar to those in the DM), and we used Euros instead of Swiss
Francs. Figure 2.3 gives an example of one of the choice lists.
Table 2.1: Risky prospects
p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.10 200 100 0.25 500 200
0.50 200 100 0.50 500 200
0.90 200 100 0.75 500 200
0.05 400 100 0.95 500 200
0.25 400 100 0.05 1500 500
0.50 400 100 0.50 100 0
0.75 400 100 0.50 200 0
0.95 400 100 0.05 400 0
0.05 500 200 0.95 500 0
0.10 1500 0 0.25 400 0
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Figure 2.3: Choice list of prospects for the CE elicitation
2.5 Results
Because normality of distributions was always rejected, we used Wilcoxon signed
rank tests throughout.
2.5.1 Results for the DM
In all tests reported below p ≤ 0.001 except when noted. The DM elicits subjective
midpoints of time intervals (q, t], denoted s(q, t]. Table 2.2 shows that s(q, t] was always
closer to q than to t, which is consistent with impatience. Figure 2.4 shows that the
cumulative C function was concave, also indicating impatience. We can derive the
discount factors dj = C(j)−C(j − 1) from C. They are in Figure 2.5 in Section 2.5.3,
where they are compared with the UM discount factors.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the Direct Method (DM)
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max N
c 1
8
5.55 1.25 2.13 6.13 9.13 97
c 1
4
11.47 1.91 4.25 12.25 15.25 97
c 1
2
24.47 2.72 14.50 25.50 29.50 97
c 3
4
37.77 2.22 27.75 38.75 42.75 97
c 7
8
44.5 1.45 39.88 44.88 47.88 97
Figure 2.4: C function of mean data
Statistical tests confirmed the above observations. In all tests, we could reject the
one-sided null of no or negative impatience (s(q, t] ≥ q+t
2
) in favor of the alternative
hypothesis of impatience (s(q, t] < q+t
2
) 3.
Decreasing impatience, found in many studies, implies that c1/2
2
− c1/4 > (c1/2+52)2 −
c3/4 and
c1/4
2
− c1/8 > (c3/4+52)2 − c7/8. The evidence on decreasing impatience was mixed
and depended on the rounding assumption used (see the online appendix). Under
one rounding assumption4, we found decreasing impatience in the comparison between
(0, c1/2] and (c1/2, 52] and increasing impatience in the comparison between (0, c1/4]
3c1/2 < 26, c1/4 < c1/2/2, c1/2 < (c1/4 + c3/4)/2 (marginally significant), c3/4 < (c1/3 + 52)/2,
c1/8 < c1/4/2, and c7/8 < (52 + c3/4)/2.
4A large middle group (n=37) gave answers as close as possible to constant discounting. The first
rounding takes them as slightly impatient. It can also be argued that the null of constant discounting
should be accepted for them (our second rounding).
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and (c3/4, 52]. Under another rounding assumption, the null of constant impatience
could not be rejected. For all other tests in this paper, the rounding assumptions were
immaterial.
To test separability condition (i) in Proposition 3, we directly measured the sub-
jective midpoint s1/2 of (c1/4, c3/4]. That is, α(c1/4,s1/2]0 ∼ α(s1/2,c3/4]0. By condition (i),
s1/2 should equal c1/2. To test separability condition (ii) in Proposition 3, we directly
measured the value s3/4 such that α(0,c3/4]0 ∼ α(s3/4,52]0. This second measurement is
of a different nature than the questions asked in the rest of the experiment, because
now a lower point of an interval is determined rather than a midpoint. By Condition
(ii), s3/4 should equal c3/4.
Separability was rejected in the first test (p < 0.01 two-sided), but not in the second.
Even in the first test, we found few violations of separability at the individual level.
Separability was satisfied exactly for 54 out of 97 subjects. Moreover, s1/2 and c1/2
differed by 1 at most for 80 subjects. In the second test, separability could not hold
exactly due to rounding, but 55 subjects had the minimal difference of 0.5, and 76
subjects had the difference 1.5 or less.
2.5.2 Results for the UM
Table 2.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the discount factors duj under the
normalization du3 = 1, the discount factor of the shortest delay in the UM. Comparing
pairs of consecutive discount factors confirmed impatience (always p < 0.001). We
derived the cumulative function Cu(j) =
∑j
i=1 d
u
i from the discount factors. For easy
comparison with the DM, we renormalized Cu(52) = 1 for Cu.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of the utility-based method (UM)
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max N5
du4 0.93 0.07 0.67 0.96 1 96
du12 0.87 0.12 0.44 0.92 1 96
du20 0.85 0.14 0.33 0.89 1 96
du28 0.79 0.17 0.33 0.83 1 96
du36 0.77 0.18 0.33 0.81 1 96
du44 0.75 0.20 0.26 0.78 1 96
du52 0.73 0.21 0.26 0.76 1 96
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2.5.3 Comparing discounting and impatience under the DM
and the UM
Figure 2.5 shows the discount factors of the DM and the UM. For easy compari-
son, we normalized both to 1 at week 3 here. Both discount factors were decreasing,
confirming impatience. The DM discount factors slightly exceeded the UM discount
factors, but not significantly (tests provided later). According to both methods, the
annual discount rate was 35%, assuming continuous compounding e−rt with t in years.
Figure 2.6 shows the cumulative functions of the DM and the UM, using linear
interpolation to obtain general values duj from the seven measured duj ’s. We measured
impatience (= concavity) for each cumulative function by the difference between the
area under this function and that under the diagonal (t 7→ t/52). This index is negative
for convex functions. It is 0 if the decision maker does not discount.
Figure 2.5: Comparing discount factors of the DM and the UM
5We excluded one subject because of his extreme power (-118.7; overall average is 0.53) for utility.
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Figure 2.6: Comparing cumulative discount weights of the DM and the UM
The average value of the impatience index was 1.14 for the DM and 1.62 for the
UM. Both indices exceeded 0 (p < 0.001), in agreement with impatience. The index
for the UM exceeded that for the DM (p = 0.02), suggesting more impatience under
the UM.
We also estimated the DM and UM curves in Figure 2.6 by a power function. The
median powers were 0.96 for the DM and 0.93 for the UM. Both powers were below
1 (both p < 0.001), again confirming impatience, but they did not differ significantly
from each other. The three measures of impatience (discount factors for week 52, area-
differences, and estimated power coefficients) correlated strongly (≥ 0.90), for both the
DM and the UM. For consistency between the two methods at the individual level,
we tested correlations of the three measures of impatience between the DM and UM.
They were all around 0.25 (p < 0.001). Hence, even though the different measures led
to consistent conclusions within methods, differences remained.
2.5.4 Parametric estimations
The discount factors trace out the discount function D(t) without making paramet-
ric assumptions (see Figure 2.5). This section reports parametric fittings. We estimated
the discount function of each subject by maximum likelihood using the following three
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parametric families.
1. Constant discounting (Samuelson 1937), with one parameter r ≥ 0:
D(t) = e−rt with r ≥ 0.
2. Hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), with two parameters α ≥
0 and β > 0:
For α > 0 : D(t) = (1 + αt)−
β
α ;
for α = 0 : D(t) = e−βt.
The α parameter determines how much the discount function departs from con-
stant discounting. The limiting case α = 0 reflects constant discounting. The β
parameter determines impatience.
3. Unit-invariance discounting6 , with two parameters r > 0 and d:
For d > 1, D(t) = ert1−d (only if t = 0 is not considered);
for d = 1, D(t) = t−r (only if t = 0 is not considered);
for d < 1, D(t) = e−rt1−d .
The r-parameter determines impatience and the d-parameter determines depar-
ture from constant discounting, interpreted as sensitivity to time by Ebert and
Prelec (2007). The common empirical finding is d ≤ 1, reflecting insensitivity.
Hyperbolic discounting can only account for decreasing impatience. However, em-
pirical studies have observed that a substantial proportion of subjects are not decreas-
ingly, but increasingly impatient (references in section 2.5.5). Unit-invariance discount-
ing can account for both decreasing and increasing impatience. We can use the entire
6Read (2001 Eq. 16) first suggested this family. Ebert and Prelec (2007) called it constant sensi-
tivity, and Bleichrodt et al. (2009) called it constant relative decreasing impatience. Bleichrodt et al.
(2013) proposed the term unit-invariance.
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unit invariance family because our domain does not contain t = 0 (explained in the dis-
cussion section). The exclusion of t = 0 also implies that the popular quasi-hyperbolic
family coincides with constant discounting for our stimuli.
Table 2.4 shows the estimated parameters. The exponential discounting parameters
differed between the UM and the DM (p < 0.001), reflecting more discounting for the
UM. The parameters of hyperbolic discounting and unit-invariance discounting did not
differ significantly (p > 0.2).
Table 2.4: Results of parametric fittings for the DM and the UM
Exponential Hyperbolic Unit-Invariance
Mean(r) Median(r) Mean(α, β) Median(α, β) Mean(d,r) Median(d,r)
Par. UM 0.009 0.006 1.88, 0.25 1.21, 0.06 0.58, 2.19 0.94, 0.69
DM 0.005 0.002 1.66, 0.14 1.30, 0.05 0.80, 1.86 0.89, 0.25
AIC UM -3.03 -3.26 -1.55 -1.68 -1.63 -1.70
DM -3.56 -3.68 -1.66 -1.80 -1.65 -1.78
The final two rows of Table 2.4 show the goodness of fit of the three discount families
by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). More-negative values indicate better fit. The
DM method with exponential discounting fitted better than the UM with exponential
discounting (p < 0.001), and gave the best fit overall. The DM also seemed to fit
better for hyperbolic discounting and unit-invariance, but these differences were not
significant. Of the three parametric families, exponential discounting fitted best for
both the DM and the UM (both p < 0.001). For the UM, hyperbolic discounting gave
the worst fit (p < 0.001). For the DM we found no significant difference between unit-
invariance and hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.22). In the absence of the immediacy
effect, exponential discounting performed well, which also supports quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. The online appendix gives further details.
We, finally, investigated the relation between impatience (concavity of C and Cu)
and risk attitudes, controlling for demographic variables (age, gender, and foreign ver-
sus domestic-Dutch). Impatience under the UM was negatively related with concavity
of utility, which is not surprising because the UM measurements were based on utility.
Under the DM, impatience was not related with utility, suggesting that these are inde-
pendent components. Impatience under the UM was also negatively related with risk
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aversion in the form of pessimism of probability weighting, in contrast to impatience
under the DM. Age was positively related with UM impatience. Other relations were
not significant. Details are in the online appendix.
2.5.5 Discussion of the results
The DM and the UM led to similar conclusions. Under both methods, subjects
were impatient. However, we found less discounting with the DM. The high estimated
annual discount rate (35%) suggests that this is a desirable feature of the DM.
Even though theoretical studies commonly assume universal decreasing impatience,
many empirical studies have found considerable increasing impatience at the individual
level. We found prevailing decreasing impatience in the UM, but mixed evidence in the
DM. Statistical tests only showed weak evidence for decreasing impatience, and Figure
2.5 suggests that impatience was not always decreasing. Increasing impatience implies
that people become more reluctant to wait as time passes by. The presence of several
subjects with increasing impatience in our data also explains the poor performance of
the hyperbolic discount functions, which only allow for universal decreasing impatience,
and cannot fit the data of increasingly impatient subjects.
Our measurement of the DM included two tests of separability, a condition un-
derlying the method. One test suggested violations of separability, but we could not
reject separability in the other test. In both tests, most subjects behaved in agreement
with it. The DM, like any decision model, does not fit data perfectly, but we still use
such decision models in the absence of better models that are sufficiently tractable.
Violations of separability may, for example, be due to sequencing effects and habit for-
mation (Loewenstein and Prelec, p.350; Dolan and Kahneman, p.228). The DM allows
easy tests of separability that help to assess its restrictiveness. Such tests are desirable
because separability is used in virtually all applications of discount measurements.
Besides separability, our analysis also assumes independence of discounting from
the outcome used. This condition is sometimes called separability of money and time,
and its violation the magnitude effect (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). If magnitude
effects exist, then our measurements are only valid for outcomes close to those used in
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the measurements.
We used the method of EFB for the UM. Our estimates of risk attitudes were
close to theirs except for the curvature of utility, which can be explained by the larger
outcomes we used (further details are in the appendix). We could not directly compare
our findings on discounting with those of EFB, because they used fewer and different
timepoints. The negative relation between concave utility and impatience that we found
for the UM is not surprising because utility plays a central role in the UM. Concave
utility increases the ratio in Eq. 2.6 and thus decreases impatience. The negative
relation between impatience and probability weighting suggests that this component
of risk attitude also affects the UM measurements. Our findings suggest that there is
collinearity between utility/risk attitude and discounting in the UM, but not in the
DM.
Our implementation of the DM is adaptive, with answers to questions influenc-
ing the stimuli in later questions. Theoretically, this may offer scope for manipulation:
responding untruthfully to some questions may improve later stimuli. However, accord-
ing to Bardsley et al. (2010 p. 265) classification, this possibility is only theoretical
and is no cause for concern in our experiment. First, it was virtually impossible for
subjects to realize that questions were adaptive because of the roundings used. Second,
we expect that even readers like us, who are aware of the adaptive nature and even of
the stimuli of our experiment beforehand, are not likely to see how the loss of wrongly
answering one question could be compensated by advantages in follow-up questions.
This would be impossible for our subjects. Online Appendix WE gives details. For
these two reasons, manipulation is only a theoretical concern for our experiment.
The DM can be implemented nonadaptively. For example, we can select a number
of outcome streams αAjβ and timepoints sj beforehand, and measure the timepoints tj
such that αAjβ ∼ α(sj ,tj ]β for all j. Observation 1 still gives equalities C(Aj) = C(sj, tj].
We can use these in parametric fittings of C or in tests of properties such as decreasing
impatience, without requiring knowledge about U . A drawback of this nonadaptive
procedure is that we then cannot readily draw a connected C-curve as in Figures 2.4
and 2.6, where we needed no parametric assumption (other than linear interpolation).
The DM always had a better fit than the UM, and exponential discounting always
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fitted best, with unit-invariance second best. Exponential discounting could perform
well because we did not include the present t = 0 in our stimuli, where most violations
are found due to the immediacy effect (Attema, 2012). Although this effect is important
and deserves further study, we decided to focus our first implementation of the DM on
a better understood empirical domain, which we could compare directly with EFB. In
this regard, we follow many other studies in the literature that use front-end delays.
The DM can readily investigate the immediacy effect and discrete outcomes at
t = 0. The latter are then interpreted as salaries paid at the beginning, instead of at
the end of periods (weeks in our case). Given that the relations that we made with flow
variables only served as intermediate tools in our mathematical analysis, and played no
role in the stimuli or results, we can use the interpretation mentioned. Quasi-hyperbolic
discounting then implies a high weight for the first week of salary (now mathematically
representing the present rather than the timepoint one week ahead), and moderate
weights for the other weeks.
2.6 General discussion
Attema et al. (2010) measured discounting up to a power without the need to know
utility, but needed separate measurements to identify the power. Unlike the DM but
like the UM, their measurements did not need time separability, but they could not
test it either. In a mathematical sense, our method is similar to the measurement of
subjective probability based on equal likelihood assessments, where utility also drops
from the equations and separability (now over events) is assumed (Baillon, 2008).
Subjective midpoints, used by the DM to measure discounting, have a long tradition
in psychophysics (bisection; Stevens, 1936) and mathematics (quasi-arithmetic mean;
Aczel, 1966). Condition (i) in Proposition 3, a necessary condition of a quasi-arithmetic
mean, is a special case of autodistributivity (Aczel, 1966; Eq. 6.4.2.3, for t the midpoint
of x and y).
To our best knowledge, all experimental measurements of money discounting have
used discrete outcomes. Real-life decisions often involve flow outcomes that are re-
peated per time unit. Examples are salary payments, pension saving plans, and mort-
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gage debt repayments. In such contexts, the DM is more natural than discrete methods
such as the UM. For discrete outcomes, the DM can be an alternative to the UM if
the payments are sufficiently frequent and the periods are sufficiently fine, as in our
experiment. However, the DM is less useful for decisions in which outcomes occur
infrequently, such as for single-outcome decisions.
In the DM, subjects only make tradeoffs between periods. In the UM, subjects
make tradeoffs both between outcomes and between periods, which is more complex.
Hence, the DM is easier for subjects. Our experiment gave indirect support: We found
a positive correlation between utility curvature and discounting for the UM, but not
for the DM, showing that outcome tradeoffs impact time tradeoffs in the UM, but not
in the DM.
The DM is also easier to use for researchers, because of the elementary nature of
Observation 1. In the DM, we only used seven questions7. In the UM, we also used
seven questions to elicit discounting, but we needed additional questions to elicit utility.
The DM took much less time.
The DM can be analyzed using parametric econometric fittings (Section 2.5.4), as
can all existing methods, but, unlike most methods, the DM can also be analyzed in a
parameter-free way (Section 2.5.1). This reveals the correct discount function without a
commitment to a parametric family of discount functions. The DM can also be used for
interactive prescriptive measurements in consultancy applications (Keeney and Raiffa,
1976).
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new method to measure the discounting of money, the
direct method. This method is simpler than existing methods because it does not need
information about utility. Consequently, the experimental tasks are easier for subjects,
researchers have to ask fewer questions, and the measurements are not distorted by
biases in utility. An experiment confirms the implementability and validity of the
7We used the same numbers of questions to make the methods comparable. In fact, two DM
questions tested separability. The DM derived the discount functions from only five measurements.
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direct method.
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2.8 Appendix A. Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. This proof is elementary in not using technical
assumptions such as continuity. The proof only uses the two outcomes used in the pref-
erences, being α and 0. For deriving the first indifference, we denote outcome streams
as quadruples (x1, x2, x3, x4), with x1 received in (0,c 1
4
], x2 in (c 1
4
, c 1
2
], x3 in (c 1
2
, c 3
4
], and
x4 in (c 3
4
, 52]. We only use the following parts of Eq. 2.7: (α, α, 0, 0) ∼ (0, 0, α, α) (1),
(α, 0, 0, 0) ∼ (0, α, 0, 0) (2), and (0, 0, α, 0) ∼ (0, 0, 0, α) (3). Assume, for contradiction,
that (i) is violated, say (0, α, 0, 0)  (0, 0, α, 0) (4). This, (2), (3), and transitivity,
imply (α, 0, 0, 0)  (0, 0, 0, α) (5). By separability, (4) implies (α, α, 0, 0)  (α, 0, α, 0),
and (5) implies (α, 0, α, 0)  (0, 0, α, α). By transitivity, (α, α, 0, 0)  (0, 0, α, α), con-
tradicting (1). Reversing all preferences shows that (0, α, 0, 0) ≺ (0, 0, α, 0) implies the
contradictory (α, α, 0, 0) ≺ (0, 0, α, α). The indifference in (i) has been proved. The
second indifference follows from the first, (2), (3), and transitivity.
2.9 Appendix B. Details of the DM
Preferences α{1,...,j}0 ≺ α{j+1,...,52}0 and α{1,...,j+1}0  α{j+2,...,52}0 reveal that c 1
2
is in
the interval (j, j+1). We then estimate c 1
2
= j+ 1
2
. For the DM, we used the following
roundings to derive the discount factors from the C function (Figure 2.5). For each
of the six periods considered (bounded by t = 0, the five cp values that we measured,
and t = 52), we divided the increase of C over this period by the length of the period
to obtain the average week-weight d over this period. We assigned this d value to the
midpoint of the period, and we used linear interpolation between these midpoints. We
normalized (setting d = 1) at the smallest positive timepoint considered, being c1/82.
Its average (2.75) was approximately 3, leading to about the same normalization as
with the UM. Thus we obtained a d-function over the interval (3, 48.25], with 48.25
the average midpoint of the last interval (c 7
8
, 52].
Because we only presented integer-week periods to subjects, and estimates of cp
were usually nonintegers, we could not present exact cp values to our subjects in our
adaptive experiment. For example, to find the subjective midpoint c 1
4
of (0, c 1
2
], we
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rounded c 1
2
and took the smallest larger integer, denoted j + 1 here, and then found
the subjective midpoint x of (0, j+1]. To derive c 1
4
from this midpoint x, we corrected
for the roundings. Because we had used j + 1 instead of c 1
2
, which on average is an
overestimation of c 1
2
by 1
2
, and half of it will propagate into x, we subtracted 1
4
from
x to get c 1
4
. In all other estimations of values cp, we similarly used roundings and
corrections. Complete details of the roundings and corrections for all cp are in the
online appendix.
2.10 Appendix C. Details of the UM
Following EFB, we adopted power utility Wakker (2008) and Prelec’s (1998) two-
parameter probability weighting:
If η > 0, then u(x) = xη;
If η = 0, then u(x) = ln(x);
If η < 0, then u(x) = −xη;
w(p) = e−β(−ln(p))
α .
For convenience, x is generic for outcomes in this appendix. The average value of
the utility parameter η was 0.47 (in EFB, η = 0.87), which reflects concavity8. The
difference found can be explained by the higher outcomes we used. The average in-
sensitivity index α was 0.55 (in EFB, α = 0.51), indicating departure from linear
probability weighting. The average estimates for the pessimism index β was 0.94 (in
EFB, β = 0.97). In Eq. 2.6 we should have U(0) = 0, which agrees with prospect
theory’s scaling. Following EFB, the estimation of utility is carried out after shifting
all outcomes by one unit of money, so as to avoid mathematical complications of log-
arithmic or negative-power utility at x = 0. We followed EFB in using choice lists to
elicit λ in Eq. 2.5 (details are in the online appendix). If the largest value in a choice
list was still too small to lead to preference, we assumed preference to switch in the
8The average value of the parameters in our analysis is based on 96 subjects (including subjects
who have missing values). EFB removed all subjects with missing values.
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first higher value to follow. We thus use censored data. It gives a smaller bias than
dropping these subjects, the most impatient ones, as done by EFB, and it keeps more
subjects for other measurements. The DM measurements need no censoring of data
because the indifference points are always between extremes of the choice lists.
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Chapter 3
An Experimental Test of Reduction
Invariance
3.1 Introduction
Probability weighting is an important reason why people deviate from expected
utility (Fox and Poldrack, 2014; Luce, 2000; Wakker, 2010). Prelec (1998) proposed a
functional form for the probability weighting function that is widely used in empirical
research and usually gives a good fit to empirical data (Sneddon and Luce, 2001; Stott,
2006; Chechile and Barch, 2013).
Although other functional forms have also been used (e.g. Currim and Sarin, 1989;
Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Karmarkar, 1978; Lattimore et al., 1992; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992), Prelec was the first to give an axiomatic foundation for a form
of the probability weighting function1. His central condition, compound invariance
(defined in Section 3.2), is, however, complex to test empirically as it involves four
indifferences and may be subject to error cumulation. To the best of our knowledge, it
has not been tested yet.
Luce (2001) proposed a simpler condition, reduction invariance. Luce (2000, p.278)
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Ilke Aydogan and Han Ble-
ichrodt.
1For a more recent axiomatic analysis of probability weighting see Diecidue et al. (2009).
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identified testing reduction invariance as an important open empirical problem. The
purpose of this paper is to follow up on Luce’s suggestion and to test reduction invari-
ance in an experiment. Our data support the validity of reduction invariance. At the
aggregate level, we found evidence for the condition and at the individual level it was
clearly the dominant pattern.
A special case of reduction invariance is the rational case of reduction of compound
gambles, which implies that the probability weighting function is a power function. Our
data on reduction of compound gambles are mixed. At the aggregate level reduction
of compound gambles was clearly violated. However, 60% of our subjects behaved in
line with it. The subjects who deviated, did so systematically and found compound
gambles more attractive than simple gambles.
3.2 Background
Let (x, p) denote a gamble which gives consequence x with probability p and nothing
otherwise. Consequences can be pure, such as a money amounts, or they can be a
gamble (y, q) where y is a pure consequence. The set of pure consequences is a nonpoint
interval X in R+ that contains 0. Preferences < are defined over the set C of gambles.
We identify preferences over simple gambles (x, p) from preferences over ((x, p), 1) and
preferences over consequences x from preferences over (x, 1).
A function U represents < if it maps gambles and pure consequences to the reals
and for all gambles (x, p), (x′, p′) in C, (x, p) < (x′, p′) ⇔ U(x, p) ≥ U(x′, p′). If a
representing function U exists then < must be a weak order: transitive and complete.
The representing function U is multiplicative if there exists a functions W : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] such that:
i. U(x, p) = U(x)W (p).
ii. U(0) = 0 and U is continuous and strictly increasing.
iii. W (0) = 0 and W is continuous and strictly increasing.
The functions U and W are unique up to different positive factors and a joint positive
power: U → a1U b and W → a2W b, a1, a2, b > 0. This uniqueness implies that we can
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always normalize W such that W (1) = 12. Luce (1996, 2000; Marley and Luce,2002)
gave preference foundations for the multiplicative representation. A central condition
in these results is consequence monotonicity, which we also assume here3.
The multiplicative representation is general and contains many models of deci-
sion under risk as special cases. Examples are expected utility, rank-dependent utility
(Quiggin, 1981, 1982), prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), disappoint-
ment aversion theory (Gul, 1991), and rank-dependent utility (Luce, 1991; Luce and
Fishburn, 1991, 1995).
Prelec (1998) axiomatized the following family of weighting functions:
Definition 1: W (p) is compound-invariant if there exist α > 0 and β > 0 such
that W (p) = exp(−β(−lnp)α).
Prelec’s compound-invariant weighting function has several desirable properties.
First, it includes the power functions W (p) = pβ as a special case. The class of power
weighting functions is the only one that satisfies reduction of compound gambles, which
is often considered a feature of rational choice:
((x, p), q) ∼ (x, pq).
A second advantage of the compound-invariant family is that for α < 1, it can account
for inverse S-shaped probability weighting, which has commonly been observed in em-
pirical studies (Fox and Poldrack, 2014; Wakker, 2010). Finally, the parameters α and
β have an intuitive interpretation (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). The parameter α reflects
a decision maker’s sensitivity to changes in probability, with higher values representing
more sensitivity, while β reflects the degree to which a decision maker is averse to risk,
with higher values reflecting more aversion to risk.
2Aczel and Luce (2007) analyzed the case where W (1) 6= 1 to model non-veridical responses in
psychophysical theories of intensity (Luce, 2002, 2004).
3Consequence monotonicity means that if two gambles differ only in one consequence, the one
having the better consequence is preferred. As Luce (2000, p. 45) points out, it implies a form of
separability for compound gambles. It also implies backward induction, where each simple gamble
in a compound gamble can be replaced by its certainty equivalent. von Winterfeldt et al. (1997)
found few violations of consequence monotonicity for choice-based elicitation procedures, as used in
our experiment, and what there was seemed attributable to the variability in certainty equivalence
estimates.
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The compound-invariant family of weighting functions satisfies the following condi-
tion:
Definition 2: Let N be any natural number. N-compound invariance holds if
(x, p) ∼ (y, q), (x, r) ∼ (y, s), and (x′, pN) ∼ (y′, qN) imply (x′, rN) ∼ (y′, sN) for all
nonzero consequences x, y, x′, y′ and nonzero probabilities p, q, and r.
Compound invariance holds if N-compound invariance holds for all N. Prelec (1998)
showed that if compound invariance is imposed on top of the multiplicative representa-
tion thenW (p) is compound-invariant. Bleichrodt et al. (2013) showed that compound
invariance by itself implies the multiplicative representation and, consequently, that
the assumption of a multiplicative representation is redundant.
Compound invariance is difficult to test empirically. It requires four indifferences
and elicited values appear in later elicitations, which may lead to error cumulation.
For example, we could fix x, p, q, r, and x′. The first indifference would then elicit y,
the second s, and the third y′. If each of these variables is measured with some error
then this will affect the final preference between (x′, rN) and (y′, sN).
To address the problem of error cumulation, Luce (2001) proposed a simpler con-
dition.
Definition 3: Let N be any natural number. N-reduction invariance holds if
((x, p), q) ∼ (x, r) implies ((x, pN), qN) ∼ (x, rN) for all nonzero consequences x and
nonzero probabilities p, q, and r.
Reduction invariance holds if N -reduction invariance holds for all N . Reduction
invariance is easier to test than compound invariance as it requires only two indiffer-
ences. Luce (2001, Proposition 1) showed that if N -reduction invariance for N = 2, 3 is
imposed on top of the multiplicative representation then the weighting function W (p)
is compound-invariant4.
4To the best of our knowledge, Bleichrodt et al.’s (2013) result cannot be generalized to reduction
invariance and the multiplicative representation still has to be assumed in this case.
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3.3 Experiment
The purpose of our experiment was to test reduction invariance (for N=2,3) to ob-
tain insight into the descriptive validity of the compound-invariant weighting function.
The simplest way to test reduction invariance would be to fix x, p, and q, to elicit the
probability r such that a subject is indifferent between ((x, p), q) and (x, r), and then
to check whether he is indifferent between ((x, pN), qN) and (x, rN). However, as Luce
(2001) pointed out, a danger of this procedure is that many subjects may realize that
r = pq is a sensible response. This may distort the results as empirical evidence sug-
gests that subjects do not satisfy reduction of compound gambles (Abdellaoui et al.,
2015; Bar-Hillel, 1973; Bernasconi and Loomes, 1992; Keller, 1985; Slovic, 1969). Luce
(2001) suggested another approach for testing reduction invariance, which we adopted
in our experiment. Instead of asking for probability equivalents, we elicited the cer-
tainty equivalents of ((x, p), q), denoted CE((x, p), q), and several CE(x, r) for a range
of values of r centered on pq. Using interpolation, we then determined the value r1 for
which CE((x, p), q) = CE(x, r1). We then elicited CE((x, p2), q2) and CE((x, p3), q3)
and tested whether CE((x, p2), q2) = CE(x, (r1)2) and CE((x, p3), q3) = CE(x, (r1)3)
where CE(x, (r1)2) and CE(x, (r1)3) were, again, determined using interpolation.
3.3.1 Procedure
The experiment was run on computers. Subjects were seated in cubicles with a
computer screen and a mouse and could not communicate with each other. Once ev-
eryone was seated, the instructions were displayed, followed by three comprehension
questions. Subjects could only proceed to the actual experiment when they had cor-
rectly answered all three comprehension questions. Copies of the instructions and the
comprehension questions are in Appendix A.
We measured the certainty equivalents of 12 compound gambles and of 6 simple
gambles. The order in which these gambles were presented was random. The winning
amount was always e200. Table 3.1 displays the compound gambles that we used.
Compound gambles C1−C4 were the original gambles, gambles C5−C8 were derived
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Table 3.1: The compound gambles used in the experiment
Compound Gamble Type Reduced Expected
gambles probability value
C1 ((e200,82%),67%) Original 54.94% e109.88
C2 ((e200,45%),67%) Original 30.15% e60.30
C3 ((e200,63%),90%) Original 56.70% e113.40
C4 ((e200,82%),39%) Original 31.98% e63.96
C5 ((e200,67%),45%) Square of C1 30.15% e60.30
C6 ((e200,20%),45%) Square of C2 9.00% e18.00
C7 ((e200,40%),81%) Square of C3 32.40% e64.80
C8 ((e200,67%),15%) Square of C4 10.05% e20.10
C9 ((e200,55%),30%) Cube of C1 16.50% e33.00
C10 ((e200,9%),30%) Cube of C2 2.70% e5.40
C11 ((e200,25%),73%) Cube of C3 18.25% e36.50
C12 ((e200,55%),6%) Cube of C4 3.30% e6.60
from C1− C4 by taking the squares of the probabilities, and gambles C9− C12 were
derived from C1 − C4 by taking the cubes of the probabilities. Because taking the
square and the cube of probabilities usually does not give round numbers, we selected
the probabilities in the compound gambles C1 − C4 such that only little rounding
was necessary in the derived compound gambles. We could have avoided rounding
altogether by presenting fractions. However, we observed in the pilot sessions that
subjects found complex fractions harder to handle than probabilities.
By comparing the certainty equivalents of C2 and C5 and (roughly) those of C4 and
C7 we could test whether subjects preferred to have most of the uncertainty resolved
in the first stage or in the second stage. Luce (1990, p. 228) already drew attention
to modeling the order in which events are carried out and Ronen (1973) and Budescu
and Fischer (2001) found that people prefer gambles with high first-stage probabilities
and lower second-stage probabilities to gambles with high second-stage probabilities
and lower first-stage probabilities. On the other hand, Chung et al. (1994) concluded
that with a choice-based procedure most subjects were indifferent to the order in which
events were carried out.
Table 3.2 shows the simple gambles that we used in the experiment. The proba-
bilities in the simple gambles were close to the reduced probabilities of the compound
gambles.
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Table 3.2: The simple gambles used in the experiment
Simple gambles Gamble Expected value
S1 (e200,3%) e6
S2 (e200,9%) e18
S3 (e200,17%) e34
S4 (e200,32%) e64
S5 (e200,57%) e114
S6 (e200,77%) e154
To determine the certainty equivalents of the compound and the simple gambles,
subjects made a series of choices between these gambles and sure amounts of money.
Simple risk and compound risk were represented by urns containing colored balls. The
color of the ball determined subjects’ payoffs. We used one urn for the simple gambles
and two urns for the compound gambles. Appendix A displays the way the simple and
the compound gambles were presented.
All certainty equivalents were elicited using a choice-based iterative procedure,
which is close to the PEST procedure used by, amongst others, Cho and Luce (1995)
and Cho et al. (1994). We did not ask subjects directly for their certainty equivalents
as this tends to lead to less reliable measurements (Bostic et al., 1990), but instead
used a series of choices to zoom in on them. The iteration procedure is described in
Appendix B.
We included two types of consistency tests. First, we repeated the third choice in
the iteration procedure for four randomly selected questions. Subjects were usually
close to indifference in the third choice and, consequently, this was a rather strong test
of consistency. Second, we repeated the entire elicitation of two certainty equivalents,
one for a randomly selected simple gamble and one for a randomly selected compound
gamble.
3.3.2 Subjects and incentives
The experiment was performed at the ESE-Econlab at Erasmus University in 5
group sessions. Subjects were 79 Erasmus University students from various academic
disciplines (average age 23.4 years, 43 female). We paid the subjects a e5 participation
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fee. In addition, at the conclusion of each session we randomly selected two subjects
who could play out one of their randomly drawn choices for real. If a subject had
chosen the sure amount in that choice then we paid him that amount. If he had chosen
the simple or the compound gamble then we created the relevant urn(s) and the subject
drew the ball that determined his payoffs. The 10 subjects who played out one of their
choices for real earned on average e49.60 per person. Sessions lasted 45 minutes on
average including 10 minutes to implement payment.
3.3.3 Analysis
To test reduction invariance, we followed Luce’s (2001) suggestion. We determined
for each compound gamble ((e200, p), q) the probability r such that CE((e200, p), q) =
CE(e200, r) using the certainty equivalents of the simple gambles and linear interpo-
lation. Subjects’ certainty equivalents of the simple gambles did not always increase
with the probability of winning e200 and, consequently, the value of r for which
CE((e200, p), q) = CE(e200, r) could not always be uniquely determined. If there
were multiple values of r for which CE((e200, p), q) = CE(e200, r) then we used the
average of these values in our analysis. We also analyzed the results using only those
responses for which r could be uniquely determined, but this did not affect our conclu-
sions. Finally, we also estimated the weighting function by smoothing splines (Hastie
et al.,2008, Section 5.4) and used this estimation to predict r5. We discuss the results
of this nonparametric regression analysis in the subsection Robustness analysis.
People’s preferences are typically stochastic and the elicited certainty equivalents
are subject to noise. Moreover, the choice-based procedure determined certainty equiv-
alents up to e1 precision and it was in theory possible that the absolute difference be-
tween CE((e200, pN), qN) and CE(e200, rN), N = 2, 3, was equal to 2 even though a
subject satisfied reduction invariance exactly. For these reasons and because CE(e200, rN), N =
2, 3, had to be approximated, which introduced further imprecision, we considered a
test of equality of the certainty equivalents too stringent. Instead, we followed Cho
and Luce’s (1995) approach in testing preference conditions and compared the pro-
5For these estimations we used the smooth.splines function in R (R core team 2015) which estimates
prediction error by generalized cross-validation.
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portions of respondents for whom CE((e200, pN), qN) > CE(e200, rN) with those
for whom CE((e200, pN), qN) < CE(e200, rN), N = 2, 3. Under reduction invari-
ance with random error, deviations from equality between CE((e200, pN), qN) and
CE(e200, rN) should be nonsystematic and we should observe that the proportion
of subjects for whom CE((e200, pN), qN) > CE(e200, rN) does not differ system-
atically from the proportion for whom CE((e200, pN), qN) < CE(e200, rN). Be-
cause our elicitation method only determined certainty equivalents up to e1 preci-
sion we took CE((e200, pN), qN) and CE(e200, rN) equal if |CE((e200, pN), qN) −
CE(e200, rN)| ≤ 26. We also analyzed the results using the exact equality. This did
not affect our conclusions at the aggregate level but, obviously decreased support for
reduction invariance at the individual level7.
Our null hypothesis is that reduction invariance holds, which involves testing the in-
variance P (CE((e200, pN), qN) > CE(e200, rN)) = P (CE((e200, pN), qN) < CE(e200, rN)).
As pointed out by Rouder et al. (2012, 2009) classic null-hypothesis significance tests
are less suitable when testing for invariances for two reasons. First, they do not allow
researchers to state evidence for the null hypothesis and, second, they overstate the
evidence against the null hypothesis. We therefore used Bayes factors to test our null
hypotheses. The Bayes factors describe the relative probability of the observed data
under the null and the alternative hypothesis. For example, a Bayes factor of 10 will
indicate that the null is 10 times more likely than the alternative given the data. We
used the package BayesFactor in R (Morey et al., 2015) to compute the Bayes factors.
Following Jeffreys (1961) we interpret a Bayes factor larger than 3 as "some evidence"
for the null, a Bayes factor larger than 10 as "strong evidence" for the null, and a
Bayes factor larger than 30 as "very strong evidence" for the null. Similarly, a Bayes
factor less than 0.33 [0.10, 0.03] is counted as some [strong, very strong] evidence for
the alternative hypothesis.
6Hence, we also defined CE((e200, pN ), qN ) > CE(e200, rN ) if CE((e200, pN ), qN ) −
CE(e200, rN ) > 2 and CE((e200, pN ), qN ) < CE(e200, rN ) if CE((e200, pN ), qN ) −
CE(e200, rN ) < −2.
7In the consistency tests and the tests of reduction of compound gambles that we report in Section
3.4 we used Bayesian t-tests. In these tests we did not have to use interpolation and a substantial
proportion of the subjects stated the same certainty equivalents. Using tests of proportions here would
make the analysis less informative and underestimate the support for the null hypothesis.
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In the individual subject analyses, we classified individual subjects based on the
number of times they displayed the patterns ((e200, pN), qN) − CE(e200, rN) < −2,
−2 < CE((e200, pN), qN)−CE(e200, rN) < 2, and CE((e200, pN), qN)−CE(e200, rN) >
2 for both N = 2 and N = 3. For 2-reduction invariance, we defined subjects who re-
ported CE((e200, p2), q2)−CE(e200, r2) < −2 more than twice as Type compound <
simple. We only required them to display this pattern in a majority of tests to account
for response error. Similarly, we defined subjects who reported CE((e200, p2), q2) −
CE(e200, r2) > 2 more than twice as Type compound > simple. The other subjects
were assumed to behave in line with reduction invariance (plus some error) and were
defined as Type RI. The classification for N = 3 was identical.
In the individual analyses of reduction of compound gambles we defined subjects
who reported CE((e200, p), q) − CE(e200, pq) < −2 in a majority of tests (more
than 6 times) as Type compound < simple. Subjects who reported CE((e200, p), q)−
CE(e200, pq) > 2 more than 6 times were defined as Type compound > simple and the
other subjects were assumed to behave in line with reduction of compound gambles
plus error and were defined as Type RCG.
3.4 Results
We removed one subject from the analyses because her responses reflected confu-
sion8. The results presented next used the responses of the remaining 78 subjects.
3.4.1 Consistency
Each subject repeated four choices and two complete elicitations. For each subject,
the repeated choices were randomly selected (and hence differed across subjects) but
they were always a choice that the subject had faced in the third step of the iteration
procedure. Subjects made the same choice in 72.8% of the repeated choices. Reversal
rates up to one third are common in the literature (Wakker et al., 1994; Stott, 2006)
and we, therefore, consider our reversal rates as satisfactory, especially if we take into
8In several choices, she chose 0 for sure over a gamble, which gave a positive probability of e200
and could not result in a payoff less than e0.
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account that subjects were usually close to indifference in the third iteration. Fifty-
four subjects (69%) had one reversal at most. Six subjects (8%) had more than two
reversals. We also analyzed the data without these subjects, but this led to similar
results and we do not report them. The proportions of reversals were about the same
in the simple gambles and in the compound gambles: 24% versus 29% and the Bayesian
95% credible intervals overlapped.
We also repeated two complete elicitations, one for a simple gamble and one for
a compound gamble. Both gambles were randomly selected and, consequently, they
differed across subjects. The data favored the null hypothesis of equality between
the original and the repeated measurement (the Bayes factors (BFs) were 6.48 for
simple gambles and 7.07 for compound gambles). The mean absolute deviation between
the original and the repeated measurement was e15.38. The median was lower (e8)
indicating that there were a few outliers with large differences, but for most subjects the
differences were modest. The data favored the null hypothesis that the mean difference
between the original and the repeated measurement was the same for the simple and
for the compound gambles (BF = 7.96).
Because the questions that were repeated had different expected values, we also
looked at the absolute difference as a percentage of the expected value. The mean
of these percentages was 60%, the median was again much lower: 18%. The data
supported the null that the means of these percentages were equal for the simple and
the compound gambles (BF = 6.96) and we had no indication that subjects made
more errors or had less precise preferences in the, arguably, more complex compound
gambles.
3.4.2 Certainty equivalents
Figure 3.1 displays the certainty equivalents of the simple and the compound gam-
bles. We divided these certainty equivalents by 200 to give a visual impression of
subjects’ risk attitudes. For risk neutral subjects, the certainty equivalents of the sim-
ple gambles (the squares in the figure) will lie on the diagonal; points above the diagonal
reflect risk seeking and points below the diagonal reflect risk aversion. The figure shows
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the usual pattern of risk seeking for small probabilities and risk aversion for moderate
and large probabilities, which is equivalent to inverse S-shaped probability weighting
if utility is linear.
Figure 3.1: Mean certainty equivalents (divided by 200) of the simple and the compound
gambles
3.4.3 Tests of reduction invariance
Figure 3.2 shows the results of the eight tests of reduction invariance that we per-
formed. Panel I shows the results of the four tests of 2-reduction invariance and Panel
II those of the four tests of 3-reduction invariance. For each test we have indicated the
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BF-values.
Figure 3.2: Mean certainty equivalents (divided by 200) of the simple and the compound
gambles
Note: the figure shows the number of subjects for whom the certainty equivalent of the compound
gamble is greater than respectively smaller than the certainty equivalent of the simple gamble (taking
into account the imprecision in our measurements). Under reduction invariance these numbers should
not differ systematically. BF stands for Bayes factor with higher values indicating more support for
the null hypothesis that reduction invariance holds.
I: Tests of 2-reduction invariance
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II: Tests of 3-reduction invariance
Pooled over all tests, the data supported the null hypothesis that reduction invari-
ance held (BF = 5.34). This was also true if we look at the tests of 2-RI (BF = 4.77)
and 3-RI (BF = 5.12). If we look at the eight tests separately, the data did not provide
much support for either the null or the alternative. The exception was the third test of
3-RI which provided very strong evidence for the alternative that reduction invariance
did not hold and the first test of 3-RI which provided some evidence for reduction
invariance.
Table 3.3 shows the classification of the subjects. Reduction invariance was the
dominant type with 45% of the subjects satisfying it in both tests. No other type was
close to reduction invariance. Both in the tests of 2-RI and in the tests of 3-RI around
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60% of the subjects satisfied reduction invariance. Two thirds of the subject could be
classified the same way in both the 2-RI and the 3-RI tests. The data support the
hypothesis that amongst the subjects who could be classified the same way those who
behaved according to reduction invariance were more common than those who did not
behave according to reduction invariance (BF = 3.81).
Table 3.3: Classification of subjects in the 2-reduction invariance (2-RI) and the 3-
reduction invariance (3-RI) tests
Type
2-RI
Totalcompound >simple RI compound <simple
3-RI
compound >simple 6 8 0 14
RI 8 35 5 48
compound <simple 1 4 11 16
Total 15 47 16 78
3.4.4 Tests of reduction of compound gambles
The general picture that emerges from our results is that reduction invariance was
supported. This poses the question whether the special, rational case of reduction
invariance, reduction of compound gambles, also held. Our results indicate that it
did not hold at the aggregate level. Figure 3.1 gives a visual impression. The circles
show the certainty equivalents of the compound gambles plotted against the reduced
probabilities. If reduction of compound gambles held the circles and the squares should
overlap. It is clear from the Figure that they did not. Bayesian tests revealed very
strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis that reduction of compound gambles
should be rejected (BF = 1.14e− 23)9.
However, at the individual level we observed that around 47 (60%) of the subjects
behaved in line with reduction of compound gambles (taking account of preference im-
precision). The subjects who deviated from it, deviated overwhelmingly in the direction
of higher certainty equivalents for the compound gambles than for the corresponding
9The pairwise tests supported the alternative hypothesis that reduction of compound gambles did
not hold with Bayes factors less than .33 except for the differences between C6 and S2 (BF = 3.14)
and between C8 and S2 (BF = 5.70) where the data gave some evidence for reduction of compound
gambles and the differences between C11 and S3 (BF = 0.68), C2 and S4 (BF = 1.07), and C4 and
S4 (BF = 0.94) where the data supported neither the null nor the alternative hypothesis.
43
simple gambles (according to the Bayes factors the posterior probability that a subject
who deviated from reduction of compound gambles had a higher certainty equivalent
for the compound gamble was 5642 times as high as the probability that he had a
higher certainty equivalent for the corresponding simple gamble).
3.4.5 Robustness
We used linear interpolation in the analysis of reduction invariance to determine
CE(200, r2) and CE(200, r3). A problem in this analysis was that we could not always
determine r uniquely. We, therefore, also used interpolation by smoothing splines, a
nonparametric regression technique which smoothens out response errors. The fit was
good for most subjects.
The figures for this robustness check are in Appendix C. Overall, the robustness
check led to the same conclusions as the analysis using linear interpolation. Based
on the pooled data, the support for reduction invariance increased compared to the
analysis using linear interpolation (BF = 8.63). The results of the separate tests were
largely similar to those under linear interpolation except that in the third test of 2-RI
we now also observed some evidence that reduction invariance did not hold. However,
this was no longer true if we did not take imprecision into account (then the Bayes
factor became 0.80). The support against reduction invariance in the third test of 3-RI
decreased from very strong evidence to some evidence.
At the individual level, reduction invariance was still clearly the dominant pattern
and the numbers were close to those observed under linear interpolation.
3.5 Discussion
Our data largely supported reduction invariance, the central condition underlying
Prelec’s (1998) compound invariant weighting function. At the aggregate level our
data provided some evidence in favor of reduction invariance and at the individual
level reduction invariance was clearly the dominant pattern. The only test in which
we found strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis that reduction invariance did
not hold was the third test of 3-RI. We do not know why this happened. The reduced
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probability in the third test of 3-RI was similar to that in the first test of 3-RI where
we found evidence for reduction invariance. The fact that in the third test of 3-RI p
was less than q cannot explain the observed violation of reduction invariance either as
this was also true in, for example, the second test of 2-RI where the null of reduction
invariance was supported over the alternative.
Our tests of reduction invariance require the use of measured certainty equiva-
lents. Luce (2000) argues that certainty equivalents may lead to biased estimations
of the subjective values of gambles due to inherently different attitudes towards gam-
bles (multi-dimensional entities) and certain money amounts (one-dimensional entities).
von Nitzsch and Weber (1988) demonstrated empirical evidence of this bias. This prob-
lem could be avoided by matching gambles with gambles, i.e. by directly elicitating r
such that ((x, p), q) ∼ (x, r) and then checking whether ((x, pN), qN) ∼ (x, rN),N=2,3.
As Luce (2001) pointed out, this test carries the risk that subjects will give the salient
answer pq = r in spite of the many observed empirical violations of reduction of com-
pound gambles. We, therefore, followed Luce’s (2001) suggestion to use certainty equiv-
alents in the tests of reduction invariance. To reduce possible distortions, we used a
choice-based procedure to determine the certainty equivalents. Previous evidence sug-
gests that observed anomalies are substantially reduced when choice-based certainty
equivalents are used instead of judged certainty equivalents (Bostic et al., 1990; von
Winterfeldt et al., 1997). The procedure we used is close to the PEST procedure used
by Luce in his experimental research (Chung et al. 1994, Cho et al. 1994, Cho and
Luce 1995).
We used several ways to account for the stochastic nature of people’s preferences.
Rather than testing equality of certainty equivalents we followed Cho and Luce (1995)
and tested whether the proportion of subjects for whom CE((200, pN), qN) exceeded
CE(200, rN) was the same as the proportion of subjects for whom CE((200, pN), qN)
was less than CE(200, rN). Moreover, we accounted for the imprecision in our mea-
surements and in the individual analyses we only required preference patterns to hold
in a majority of cases. There exist different and more sophisticated procedures to
model choice errors. For example, Davis-Stober (2009) derived statistical tests based
on order-constrained inference techniques, which were applied, amongst others in Re-
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genwetter et al. (2011) to test transitivity and in Davis-Stober et al. (2015) to compare
models based on strict weak order representations with those based on lexicographic
semiorder representations. It is interesting to repeat our analysis using these methods,
but it should be realized that they are, to the best of our knowledge, not yet applicable
to matching tasks and that they require each choice to be repeated many times. In our
experiment subjects made around 100 choices, but if we were to use the same amount
of repetitions as Regenwetter et al. (2011) or Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2012) did,
subjects would have to make more than 2000 choices, which might reduce accuracy.
We found mixed support for reduction of compound gambles, the rational special
case of reduction invariance. The condition was clearly violated at the aggregate level,
but 60% of the subjects behaved in line with it. The violations of reduction of compound
gambles that we observed indicate that subjects generally preferred compound gambles
to simple gambles giving the same reduced probability. This compound risk seeking
is consistent with Friedman (2005) and Kahn and Sarin (1988). It could be explained
by a utility of gambling (Luce and Marley, 2000; Luce et al., 2008) as the compound
gambles offer the possibility to gamble twice. On the other hand, Abdellaoui et al.
(2015) observed that their subjects were compound risk averse and preferred simple
gambles with the same reduced probability. They also observed that subjects became
more compound risk averse for higher probabilities, while we observed the opposite
pattern. The range of probabilities Abdellaoui et al. explored is larger than the range
we explored. Moreover, the compound gambles for which they found compound risk
aversion were more complex than the compound gambles we used and it was more
difficult for their subjects to compute the reduced probabilities. Complexity aversion
may have contributed to compound risk aversion in their study.
We obtained some evidence that when choosing between two gambles with the same
expected value, subjects preferred the gamble with the higher second-stage probabil-
ity to the gamble with the higher first-stage probability. This is consistent with a
preference to have most uncertainty resolved at the first stage and violates event com-
mutativity (Luce 2000). We found very strong evidence that the certainty equivalent
of C7, which offered a higher probability at the second stage, was higher than the
certainty equivalent of C4, which offered the approximately the same reduced proba-
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bility but a higher first-stage probability (according to the Bayes factors, the posterior
probability that CE(C7) > CE(C4) was 471 times as high as the probability that
CE(C7) < CE(C4)). More support for a preference to have the high probability re-
solved later comes from a comparison of compound gambles C1 and C3, which were
also close in reduced probability. We found very strong evidence that the certainty
equivalent of C3, which offered a larger second-stage probability exceeded that of C1,
which offered a larger first-stage probability (odds 56.93). On the other hand, we also
found strong evidence that the certainty equivalent of gamble C5 exceeded the certainty
equivalent of gamble C2 (odds 20.41), which is inconsistent with a preference to have
the high probability resolved later. As mentioned above, Ronen (1973) and Budescu
and Fischer (2001) obtained clear evidence to have the high probability resolved first.
Budescu and Fischer (2001) observed that hope was an important reason why their
subjects preferred higher initial probabilities. A typical reason subjects gave was that
"the progress from one stage to the other means something, it’s better to lose at a later
stage". Apparently, such considerations played no role in our study or they were offset
by other considerations such as disappointment aversion which predicts that the high
probability will be resolved later.
3.6 Conclusion
Prelec’s (1998) compound-invariant family provides a simple way to model devia-
tions from expected utility. It has a preference foundation, its parameters are intuitive,
and it has often been used in empirical research. Luce (2001) gave an elegant sim-
plification of Prelec’s central condition and our study showed evidence in support of
Luce’s central condition, reduction invariance. This implies that Prelec’s function pro-
vides an accurate description of the way people weight probabilities and endorses its
use in empirical research. Reduction of compound gambles, a special case of reduction
invariance, which is often considered rational, was rejected at the aggregate level, even
though 60% of the subjects behaved in line with it implying that the power probability
weighting function, which depends on reduction of compound gambles, should be used
with caution.
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3.7 Appendix A. Instructions and comprehension ques-
tions
Welcome!
During this experiment, you will face different choice situations involving risk. In each
situation, you are asked to choose between two prospects:
• Prospect A gives you an amount of money contingent on the color of a ball drawn
from an urn.
• Prospect B gives you an amount of money for sure.
The outcome of Prospect A can depend on a single draw from an urn or on two
consecutive draws from two different urns. Figure 3.3 shows an example of the first
scenario where the outcomes of Prospect A is determined by a single draw from an urn.
Figure 3.3: Screenshot of a question
In this choice situation, there are 100 balls in the urn, of which 77 are blue, and 23
are grey. If the drawn ball is blue, you receive e200; if it is grey, you receive e0. On
the other hand, Prospect B gives you e200 for sure. In this example, you would prefer
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Prospect B, because it gives you e200 for sure whereas receiving the same amount is
not certain in Prospect A. Figure 3.4 presents an example of the second scenario where
the outcomes of Prospect A depends on two draws.
Figure 3.4: Screenshot of a question
In this choice situation, the first draw is made from the urn displayed on the top
which contains 67 green and 33 grey balls. If the ball is green, then a second ball will
be drawn from the left urn below; otherwise it will be drawn from the right urn below.
The final outcome will be determined by the second ball. For instance, if the second
ball is drawn from the left urn, then a green ball will result in e200, and a grey ball
will result in e0. If the second ball is drawn from the right urn, then the outcome will
be e0 for sure because all balls in the right urn are green. On the other hand, Prospect
B gives you e0 for sure. In this example, you would prefer Prospect A, because it gives
you a positive chance of receiving e200 whereas Prospect B gives you e0 for sure.
Once you have made your choice between two prospects, a confirm button will appear.
If you agree with your choice, please click on it to go to the next question. You will
not be able to change your choice after you click on the "Confirm" button.
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Payment
To thank for your participation, you will receive a e5 show-up fee. In addition, two
participants in this room will play out one of her choices for real. They will be selected
randomly at the end of the experiment. For each of the selected participants, one of
the choice situations that she faced during the experiment will be randomly selected,
and his/her choice in that choice situation will be played for real.
We will now test your understanding of the instructions. Assume that you have
been selected as one of the two participants who can play a question for real and that
the question below was randomly selected.
Figure 3.5: Comprehension test
Please answer the following questions.
Question 1 How many balls are there in each urn?
• 40
• 60
• 100
50
• 81
Question 2 In the top urn, how many green balls are there?
• 40
• 60
• 100
• 81
Question 3 In which case will you receive e200?
• Draw a grey ball in the top urn, OR draw a green ball in the bottom left urn.
• Draw a green ball in the top urn, OR draw a green ball in the bottom left urn.
• Draw a grey ball in the top urn, AND draw a green ball in the bottom left urn.
• Draw a green ball in the top urn, AND draw a green ball in the bottom left urn.
51
3.8 Appendix B. The iteration procedure
Subjects always chose between a gamble and a sure amount x.
1. The initial value of x was the even number closest to the expected value of the
gamble.
2. x was decreased when it was chosen over the gamble and increased when the
lottery was chosen.
3. The initial step size was 4, 8, 16, or 32. By choosing powers of 2 we ensured that
subsequent changes were also integers. The initial step size was the number in
the set 4,8,16,32 that was closest to half the initial value.
4. The step size remained constant until the subjects switched. Then it was halved.
5. The minimum step size was 2. The switching point was the midpoint between
the largest value of x for which the gamble was preferred and the smallest value
of x for which x was preferred.
6. If a subject had to choose between 200 for sure and the gamble or between 0 for
sure and the gamble. If subjects chose the dominated option, a warning message
appeared: "Please reconsider your choice". The subject was asked to choose
again. If the subject continues to choose the dominated choice, we proceeded to
the next elicitation.
Table 3.4 shows the initial values and the initial step sizes for the eighteen gambles
in the experiment.
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Table 3.4: Initial values and initial step sizes for the gambles in the experiment
Gamble Expected value Initial value Initial step size
C1 109.88 110 32
C2 60.3 60 32
C3 113.4 114 32
C4 63.96 64 32
C5 60.3 60 32
C6 18 18 8
C7 64.8 64 32
C8 20.1 20 8
C9 33 32 16
C10 5.4 6 4
C11 36.5 36 16
C12 6.6 6 4
S1 6 6 4
S2 18 18 8
S3 34 34 16
S4 64 64 32
S5 114 114 32
S6 154 154 32
53
3.9 Appendix C. Tests of reduction invariance under
fitting of the certainty equivalents by smoothing
splines
Figure 3.6: Tests of 2-reduction invariance
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Figure 3.7: Tests of 3-reduction invariance
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Table 3.5: Classification of subjects in the 2-reduction invariance (2-RI) and the 3-
reduction invariance (3-RI) tests
Type
2-RI
Total
compound >simple RI compound <simple
3-RI
compound >simple 8 6 1 15
RI 7 30 10 47
compound <simple 1 4 11 16
Total 16 40 22 78
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Chapter 4
A Measurement of Decreasing
Impatience for Health and Money
Private and policy decisions often involve outcomes that occur at different points
in time. Examples are choosing a pension plan and funding a screening program that
reduces future illness. To account for their differences in timing, outcomes are usually
discounted at a constant rate.
Constant discounting is tractable and has normative appeal, but it is inconsistent
with observed behavior. Empirical evidence shows that discount rates typically de-
crease over time (Frederick et al., 2002; Attema, 2012). Most evidence for decreasing
impatience comes from studies using money outcomes, but it has also been observed
for other domains such as health and environmental outcomes (Bleichrodt and Johan-
nesson, 2001; van der Pol and Cairns, 2011, 2002; Khwaja et al., 2007; Hardisty and
Weber, 2009; Cairns and Van der Pol, 1997).
The violations of constant discounting have implications for policy. From Strotz
(1955), we know that a decision maker who deviates from constant discounting may
be prone to behave inconsistently over time and may have self-control problems, which
lead to self-harming behaviors such as saving too little, addiction (Gruber and Köszegi,
2001) and obesity (Scharff, 2009; Ikeda et al., 2010). These self-control problems, in
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Han Bleichrodt and Kirsten
I.M. Rohde.
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turn, may increase the welfare benefits from policy. For example, the net benefit of an
increased tax on smoking may be much larger when the smoker does not discount at
a constant rate, because the tax can serve as a commitment device that reduces the
smoker’s self-control problems and which he, therefore, values (Gruber and Köszegi,
2004). To assess the severity of departure from constant impatience, and, consequently,
the vulnerability to self-control problems and the potential benefits from policy, the
degree of decreasing impatience must be quantified. This is the aim of our paper.
Prelec (2004) showed that decreasing impatience cannot be quantified by looking
at the speed of decline of discount rates. Hence, the above mentioned support for
decreasing impatience, which compared discount rates, cannot be used to quantify de-
creasing impatience. Prelec argued that decreasing impatience should be measured by
the Pratt-Arrow convexity of the logarithm of the discount function. Unfortunately,
this measure is hard to observe empirically. Instead, we will use the method of At-
tema et al. (2010), which is informationally equivalent to Prelec’s measure and can
easily be applied empirically to measure the degree of decreasing impatience. Attema
et al.’s measure makes no assumptions about utility or intertemporal separability. Ex-
isting studies on time preference generally imposed parametric assumptions on utility
(most studies assumed linear utility) and assumed intertemporal separability. These
assumptions cause distortions in the measurement of time preferences (Attema, 2012;
Broome, 1991; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993). Finally, Attema et al.’s method allows
analyses at the individual level and, as we will show, individual time preferences are
heterogeneous.
In an experiment, we compared deviations from constant discounting for money
and health, two domains where economic analyses are widely used and discounting
is routinely applied. Knowing whether time preferences are the same for health and
money is important for both research and policy. Researchers often assume the same
(constant) discounting of money and health and government offices try to set a single
official discount rate to evaluate all public investments. If capital markets worked
perfectly then this would be the appropriate discounting policy (Moore and Viscusi,
1990). However, health is less transferable over time than money and there is no market
for health to observe. In the presence of such market imperfections, it is unclear whether
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health and money should be discounted similarly. As noted by Moore and Viscusi (1990,
p.52), this question must be resolved empirically, which is what the current paper seeks
to do.
Several papers have compared discount rates for health and money. As mentioned
above, the results from these studies cannot answer whether the degree of decreasing
impatience differs between health and money, but they do shed light on whether people
discount health and money similarly. The results are mixed (Attema 2012). While
Moore and Viscusi (1990) and Cropper et al. (1994) found the same discounting for
health and money, Cairns (1992) found more discounting for money and Cairns (1994)
and Hardisty and Weber (2009) found more discounting for health gains and less for
health losses. Moreover, the correlation between discounting for health and discounting
for money is typically low (Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996a).
The empirical deficiencies of constant discounting have led to a variety of new
discount models. The most widely-used of these is quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps
and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997), which has become part of mainstream economics
(Gruber and Köszegi, 2001; Diamond and Köszegi, 2003; DellaVigna, 2009). Empirical
evidence on the relative performance of these new discount models is thin on the ground,
especially for health. This is unfortunate given the increasing use of these models in
health (Gruber and Köszegi, 2001, 2004; Newhouse, 2006; Fang and Wang, 2015). A
final contribution of this paper is to present evidence about the descriptive validity of
discount models.
Our results indicate that most subjects deviated from constant discounting and
were decreasingly impatient for both money and health. Between 25% (for health) and
35% (for money) of our subjects behaved according to increasing impatience, a finding
that most discount models cannot explain. Subjects deviated more from constant
discounting for health than for money. This domain-dependence of discounting suggests
that evidence on time preferences for money has only limited validity for health. Of
the discounting models that we explored, hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and
Prelec, 1992) and proportional discounting (Mazur, 1987) described time preferences
for health and money best. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and constant discounting
could be rejected for both health and money.
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4.1 Background
We consider a decision maker’s preferences < over timed outcomes (x,t), which
denotes "receiving outcome x at time t". Outcomes are health states or money amounts
in our experiment. Time point t=0 is the present. We denote strict preference by ,
indifference by ∼, and reversed preferences by 4 (weak reversed preference) and ≺
(strict reversed preference). Throughout the paper, we assume that the decision maker
evaluates timed outcomes using discounted utility :
DU(x, t) = φ(t)U(x). (4.1)
In Eq.(4.1), φ is a decreasing and positive discount function and U is a real-valued
utility function. Because φ is decreasing, the decision maker is impatient and prefers to
receive good outcomes sooner rather than later. We scale φ such that φ(0) = 1. Utility
is defined relative to a neutral outcome which has the value 0. For money the neutral
outcome was receiving nothing, for health we selected a specific health state (chronic
back pain) that we assigned the value 0.
Constant impatience says that preferences between timed outcomes do not change if
we delay them by a common constant: for all σ > 0, (x, s) ∼ (y, t) with 0 ≺ x ≺ y and
s < t implies (x, s+σ) ∼ (y, t+σ). Koopmans (1960) showed that constant impatience
implies constant discounting: φ(t) = σt for 0 < σ < 1. Decreasing impatience holds
if adding a common delay makes people more willing to wait for the better outcome:
for all σ > 0,(x, s) ∼ (y, t) with 0 ≺ x ≺ y and s < t implies (x, s + σ) 4 (y, t + σ).
Empirical studies have often found decreasing impatience, for both money (Frederick
et al., 2002) and health (Attema, 2012). Increasing impatience is the opposite of
decreasing impatience and means that adding a common delay makes people less willing
to wait for a larger outcome: for all σ > 0,(x, s) ∼ (y, t) with 0 ≺ x ≺ y and s<t implies
(x, s+σ) < (y, t+σ). Several studies have found increasing impatience for money (e.g.
Attema et al., 2010; Sayman and Öncüler, 2009; Scholten and Read, 2006; Loewenstein,
1987; Takeuchi, 2011). For health, only indirect evidence of increasing impatience exists
(Attema et al., 2012).
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Let <a and <b be the preference relations over timed outcomes of decision makers
a and b. We say that <b is more decreasingly impatient than <a if for all 0 < s < t,
for all , and for all outcomes 0 ≺a x ≺a y, 0 ≺b x′ ≺b y′, if (x, s) ∼a (y, t), (x, s+σ) ∼a
(y, t+ σ + ) and (x′, s) ∼b (y′, t) then (x′, s+ σ) ≺b (y′, t+ σ + ). Intuitively, if both
a and b are willing to wait from period s to period t to receive a larger outcome (y
instead of x for decision maker a and y′ instead of x′ for decision maker b), they are
equally impatient for these outcomes and periods. Now, if a is also willing to wait from
period s + σ to period t + σ +  to receive y instead of x then b will prefer the larger
later outcome (y′, t+σ+), because his impatience decreases faster than that of a and,
thus, he becomes more future-oriented than a.
Analogously, ≺b is more increasingly impatient than ≺a if for all 0 < s < t, for all
σ > 0, for all , and for all outcomes 0 ≺a x ≺b y, 0 ≺b x′ ≺b y′, if (x, s) ∼a (y, t),
(x, s+ σ) ∼a (y, t+ σ + ) and (x′, s) ∼b (y′, t) then (x′, s+ σ) b (y′, t+ σ + ).
Various alternative models have been proposed to accommodate the deviations from
constant discounting. The most popular of these models is quasi-hyperbolic discounting
(Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997):
φ(t) =
 βσt for t > 01 for t = 0. (4.2)
with 0 < β, σ < 1. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting differs from constant discounting
only in the first period. The model assumes that a decision maker gives extra weight
to the present and the parameter β captures this present bias. Present bias leads to
decreasing impatience in the first period and constant impatience in all later periods.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) proposed a more general model, hyperbolic discount-
ing, in which decreasing impatience not only occurs in the first period but also in later
periods:
φ(t) = (1 + ht)(−r/h), h ≥ 0, r > 0. (4.3)
The parameter h measures decreasing impatience. If h=0 then hyperbolic discounting
is equivalent to constant discounting and the larger is h the more the decision maker
deviates from constant discounting. Two special cases of hyperbolic discounting are
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proportional discounting (Mazur, 1987), which results from Eq.(4.3) when h=r and
power discounting (Harvey, 1986), which results when h=1.
For money, Abdellaoui et al. (2013, 2010) concluded that hyperbolic discounting per-
formed better than constant, quasi-hyperbolic, proportional, and power discounting,
even after correction for the differences in degrees of freedom. For health, van der Pol
and Cairns (2002) found some evidence that hyperbolic discounting and power discount-
ing fitted better than constant discounting and proportional discounting. Bleichrodt
and Johannesson (2001) and van der Pol and Cairns (2011) found that hyperbolic dis-
counting fitted better than constant discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting for
health.
4.2 Time trade-off sequences
Because deviations from constant impatience are closely related to economic and
health misbehaviors, it is of interest to measure these deviations1. Prelec (2004) argued
that deviations from constant impatience should be measured by the Pratt-Arrow con-
vexity of the logarithm of the discount function:−ln(φ)′′/ln(φ)′. This measure is hard
to observe empirically. First, we must measure the discount function, which is complex
because discounting and utility interact, then we must take the logarithm, and, finally,
we must compute first and second derivatives.
Attema et al. (2010) showed that deviations from constant impatience can be
measured more easily using time trade-off sequences. To illustrate, we first choose two
outcomes x and y with x ≺ y. A time trade-off sequence is a sequence of time points
t0,t1,...,tk such that
(x, t0) ∼ (y, t1)
(x, t1) ∼ (y, t2)
...
(x, tk−1) ∼ (y, tk)
(4.4)
We call WTWi = ti − ti−1, i = 1, ..., k, the decision maker’s willingness to wait. Con-
1Strictly speaking, violations of constant impatience are not equivalent to time inconsistent behav-
ior (reversals of preference over time) and self-control problems (Harvey, 1995). However, they are
equivalent under the common assumption of time invariance (Halevy, 2015).
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stant impatience implies that the willingness to wait is constant, decreasing impatience
implies that the willingness to wait increases with i, and increasing impatience implies
that the willingness to wait decreases with i. From Eq.(4.1), we obtain
φ(t0)/φ(t1) = φ(t1)/φ(t2) = ... = φ(tk−1)/φ(tk) (4.5)
This is equivalent to:
ln(φ(t0))− ln(φ(t1)) = ln(φ(t1))− ln(φ(t2)) = ... = ln(φ(tk−1)− ln(φ(tk)) (4.6)
Eq.(4.6) shows that a time trade-off sequence is equally spaced in terms of ln(φ). This
property does not depend on utility. Utility drops from Eqs.(4.5) and (4.6) and we do
not have to make any assumptions about it.
We now define the time curve
τ(t) =
ln(φ(t))− ln(φ(tk))
ln(φ(t0))− ln(φ(tk)) (4.7)
From Eq.(4.7),τ(t0) = 1, τ(tk) = 0, and τ(tj) = 1− j/k. Because τ(tj) = 1− j/k, the
elements of the time trade-off sequence are also equally spaced in terms of τ . Under
constant discounting τ is linear, under decreasing impatience it is convex, and under
increasing impatience it is concave. Attema et al. (2010) showed that τ has the same
degree of convexity as ln(φ) = −τ ′′/τ ′ = −ln(φ)′′/ln(φ)′. In other words, τ can be
used instead of ln(φ) to measure decreasing impatience and decision maker a is more
decreasingly impatient than decision maker b if a’s time curve is more convex than b’s
time curve. The big advantage of using τ instead of ln(φ) is that τ is directly observable
whereas ln(φ) is not.
The time curve can also be used to test the different discount models. Rohde (2010)
proposed the hyperbolic factor :
hyp(i, j) =
(tj − ti)− (tj−i − ti−1)
ti(tj−1 − ti−1)− ti−1(tj − ti) (4.8)
with ti < tj and derived that:
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Observation 1 (Rohde 2010): The hyperbolic factor is:
1. equal to zero under constant discounting,
2. positive if ti−1 = 0 and zero if ti−1 > 0 under quasi-hyperbolic discounting,
3. equal to h > 0 under hyperbolic discounting. Moreover, under hyperbolic dis-
counting the denominator of Eq.(4.8) should be positive,
4. equal to r under proportional discounting, and
5. equal to 1 under power discounting.
4.3 Experiment
Our experiment elicited time trade-off sequences for health and money. We re-
cruited seventy-five students (36 female) from Erasmus University Rotterdam, mainly
from economics and business. Every subject received a e12 participation fee. The ex-
periment was computer-run in 14 small group sessions. Subjects were seated in cubicles
and could not see each other’s screens or interact.
The experiment consisted of two parts, the elicitation of the time trade-off sequences
for health and for money. We randomized the order of these parts. Each part started
with instructions and four comprehension questions (see the online appendix). After
a subject had correctly answered all four comprehension questions, he answered two
training questions. We told subjects that the training questions and the experimental
questions had no right or wrong answers and that we were only interested in their
preferences. Subjects were encouraged to ask questions at any time they wished should
something be unclear.
Table 4.1: Stimuli of the four sequences
Parts Sequence t0 x y
Health H1 immediately Treatment A Treatment B
H2 4 weeks Treatment A Treatment B
Money M1 Immediately 500 euro 550 euro
M2 4 weeks 500 euro 550 euro
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We measured four time trade-off sequences for each subject, two for health and two
for money. Table 4.1 shows the stimuli. All delays were in weeks. For both health and
money, one sequence started immediately and the other in four weeks. We randomized
which of these sequences came first.
For money we used x = e500 and y = e550 to elicit the time trade-off sequences.
For health, we told subjects to imagine that they suffered from chronic back pain (the
neutral level). Chronic back pain was described as:
• You have moderate problems in walking about.
• You have moderate problems performing your usual activities
(e.g., work, study, housework, family or leisure activities).
• You have moderate pain or discomfort.
We told subjects that there are two treatments (A and B) to relieve chronic back
pain. Table 4.2 shows the descriptions of the two treatments, which were presented to
subjects on their computer screens. For easy reference, they were also printed on cards,
which we put on subjects’ desks. Treatment B was more effective than Treatment A.
Both treatments removed the pain, but B also improved walking and the performance
of usual activities. The effects of the treatments start immediately at the beginning of
the treatment and last for exactly one week, the unit of time we use in this paper. After
this week, chronic back pain returns. Such questions are common in the measurement
of time preferences for health (e.g. Van der Pol and Cairns 2011, Hardisty and Weber
2009) except that subjects usually consider only one change in health (e.g. Treatment
A) and the duration of this change is varied. There are two advantages of keeping the
duration of change fixed. First, the utility for time duration can be entirely general.
Studies that vary the duration of change have to impose simplifying assumptions on the
utility for time duration to be able to analyze the responses and most studies assume
it is linear. A second advantage of keeping the duration of change fixed is that subjects
will more likely concentrate on the time point at which the change occurs, which is
desirable as we are interested in the properties of the discount function and not in
those of the utility function. Our instructions told subjects to adopt chronic back pain
as their neutral level of health. Because most subjects were healthy, chronic back pain
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could have been perceived as a loss and not as neutral. However, empirical evidence
suggests that the reference point or neutral level of health can be manipulated and
even healthy subjects usually adopt a health state which is worse than their current
health if instructed to do so (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002; Attema et al., 2013; van Osch
et al., 2006).
Table 4.2: The descriptions of the treatments
Each sequence consisted of four elements (k = 4). All indifferences were elicited
using a series of choices. This procedure is common in experimental economics, because
it leads to fewer inconsistencies than directly asking subjects for their indifference values
(Bostic et al., 1990). We will describe the choice-based elicitation procedure for health.
It was similar for money with e500 instead of Treatment A and with e550 instead
of Treatment B. Subjects first made several pairwise choices. These choices limited
the range within which their willingness to wait fell. Figure 4.1 gives an example of a
pairwise choice for health.
Figure 4.1: An example of a pairwise choice for health
In the first pairwise choice, the benefits of Treatment B occurred in 100 weeks. The
next choices then zoomed in on subjects’ willingness to wait. Once the range within
which their willingness to wait fell had been narrowed to at most 13 weeks, subjects
filled out a choice list. Figure 4.2 gives an example. The first and final choice on the list
had been made before. So in Figure 4.2 the subject had already chosen B in 12 weeks
over A immediately and A immediately over B in 25 weeks. Consistency requires that a
subject switches from B to A at some choice in the list. If the subject always chose the
same treatment then the elicitation would recommence for this question starting with
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the first pairwise choice. If the subject was also inconsistent in the repeated elicitation
then we treated the response to this question as missing. There were six subjects who
never switched in at least one choice list.
Figure 4.2: An example of a choice list for health
The upper bound for the delay in Option B was 500 weeks. If a subject still preferred
B for a delay of 500 weeks, we also treated his response to this question as missing.
Six subjects did this at least once. These subjects were the most patient. To test
whether the exclusion of the most patient subjects biased the results, we repeated the
individual analyses by also excluding the six most impatient subjects. This robustness
check led to the same conclusions in all but one case and we will only report the single
case where the results differed.
4.4 Results
We removed a subject’s missing choices, but kept the other, completed, choices in
the aggregate analyses. In the individual analyses, we needed all choices and the 12
subjects with missing data were removed2. The individual analyses, therefore, used the
responses of 63 subjects.
2Six subjects who never switched between Options A and B and eight who were extremely patient.
Two of the extremely patient subjects never switched either. Therefore we excluded 12 subjects in
total.
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4.4.1 Consistency
For each subject we repeated two, randomly selected, elicitations, one for health
and one for money to assess data quality. The consistency of the measurements was
good. The original and the repeated measurements did not differ, neither for health
(Wilcoxon test, p = 0.86) nor for money (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.58). The median
absolute difference between the original and the repeated measurement was one week
for both health and money.
4.4.2 Aggregate results
Figure 4.3 shows the four time curves based on the mean data. The figures based
on the median data are similar. The dashed lines correspond to constant discount-
ing. For health, Panels A and B show that the mean data deviated from constant
discounting. The convex shape of the time curves indicates that subjects were decreas-
ingly impatient3. We could reject the null hypothesis of constant impatience against
the alternative of decreasing impatience in both sequences (Page’s L-test test, both
p < 0.01). The data are inconsistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which predicts
that violations of constant discounting only occur when the present (time point 0) is
involved and, hence, not in sequence H2. We could also test quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing by removing the first observation (the present) from sequence H1. Then all health
outcomes occur in the future and quasi-hyperbolic discounting predicts constant im-
patience. This prediction could also be rejected (Page’s L-test, p < 0.01). Panels C
and D show the time curves for the two money sequences M1 and M2. We could also
reject constant impatience for money in favor of decreasing impatience (Page’s L-test,
both p < 0.01). The rejection of constant impatience in sequence M2 also violates
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Moreover, we could also reject the prediction of quasi-
3Decreasing impatience predicts that the WTW increases over the time trade-off sequence, which
was largely confirmed. In the first health sequence (H1), the first and the second WTW were lower
than the third and the fourth WTW (Wilcoxon test, all p < 0.01), but the first WTW did not differ
from the second WTW and the third WTW did not differ from the fourth WTW. In the second health
sequence (H2) all predictions were confirmed (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.02 in the comparison between the
first and the second WTW, all other p < 0.01) except that the third and the fourth WTW did not
differ.
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hyperbolic discounting that constant impatience should hold in sequence M1 when the
first observation is removed (Page’s L-test, p = 0.01).
Figure 4.3: The elicited time trade-off sequences using the mean data
Figure 4.3 suggests that the deviations from constant discounting were larger for
health than for money. To test this conjecture, we fitted the time curves by an ex-
ponential function τ(t) = e−αt, where a reflects the convexity of the time curve and,
thus, the degree of decreasing impatience −τ ′′/τ ′ = −ln(φ)′′/ln(φ)′. We used R (Team,
2013) and the nlme package Pinheiro et al. (2007) to perform a nonlinear mixed-effects
estimation of the exponential function with dummies to test for the fixed effects of
outcome domain and the initial delay and subject as a random effect. P-values were
obtained by likelihood ratio tests of the model with the dummy in question against the
model without the dummy in question.
The exponential coefficients α were indeed larger for health than for money (LR-
69
test, p < 0.01). We could not reject the null that the coefficients were the same for
the two health sequences (LR-test, p = 0.47), but for money the coefficient of sequence
M2 exceeded that of sequence M1 (LR-test, p < 0.01) signaling larger deviations from
constant discounting in sequence M2. This finding, once again, contradicts quasi-
hyperbolic discounting.
4.4.3 Individual results
The individual time curves showed much heterogeneity. To illustrate, Figure 4.4
shows the time curves of four subjects for sequence H1. Subject 24 was clearly decreas-
ingly impatient and Subject 10 was clearly increasingly impatient. The time curve
of Subject 26 resembles quasi-hyperbolic discounting. His willingness to wait first in-
creases, which is consistent with decreasing impatience, and then remains constant.
Finally, Subject 60 is first decreasingly impatient and then becomes increasingly impa-
tient. To quantify decreasing impatience, we computed for each subject a decreasing
impatience (DI) index. The DI index measures the difference between the area un-
der the diagonal and the area under the normalized time curve 4. It is positive for a
decreasingly impatient subject, zero for a constantly impatient subject, and negative
for an increasingly impatient subject. However, a subject with a zero DI index is not
necessarily constantly impatient. Subject 60 is a case in point. His time curve crosses
the diagonal and his DI index was close to zero, but he did not behave according to
constant impatience. To capture such preferences, we also computed a nonstationarity
(NS) index, which measures the deviation from constant impatience 5. The NS index
is related to the absolute value of the difference between the area under the diagonal
and the area under the normalized time curve. The larger this area the more a subject
deviated from constant discounting. The analysis based on the NS index mostly gave
the same results and we only present the results when they differed from those based
on the DI index.
4The normalized values of ti are: t˜i = ti−t0t4−t0 , i = 1,...,4. They lie between 0 and 1. The nor-
malization was necessary to compare the indices between subjects and to perform statistical tests.
The values of ti differed across subjects and, ceteris paribus, larger values of ti lead to larger differ-
ences between the areas under the diagonal and under the time curve. The DI index is defined as:
DI =
∑4
i=1 (
i
4 − t˜i).
5The NS index is defined as: NS =
∑4
i=1 | i4 − t˜i|.
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Figure 4.4: Four different time curves
Table 4.3: Classification of subjects for health based on the DI indices
Sequence H2
Decr.imp. Incr.imp. Const.imp. Subtotal
Decr.imp. 27 5 4 36
Sequence H1 Incr.imp. 4 10 2 16
Const.imp. 1 1 9 11
subtotal 32 16 15 Total: 63
Table 4.3 shows that in both health sequences a majority of the subjects were
decreasingly impatient. Around 25% of the subjects (16 out of 63) were increasingly
impatient. Impatience was a stable behavioral trait, as around 75% of the subjects
displayed the same type of impatience in both sequences. Only 9 subjects switched
from decreasing impatience in one sequence to increasing impatience in the other. These
switching subjects were typically much more patient than non-switching subjects and,
71
as a result, their willingness to wait was somewhat imprecise. For example, subject
5’s H1 and H2 sequences were (39,76,116,162) and (37,81,123,156). These sequences
suggest that subject 5 was willing to wait around 40 weeks for the improvement in
health, but as he was patient, he did not care much whether he had to wait, say, 38
weeks or 42 weeks. As a result, his responses were a bit imprecise and we classified
him as decreasingly impatient in the first sequence and as increasingly impatient in the
second sequence.
Table 4.4: Classification of subjects for money based on the DI indices
Sequence M2
Decr.imp. Incr.imp. Const.imp. Subtotal
Decr.imp. 22 6 2 30
Sequence M1 Incr.imp. 10 10 2 22
Const.imp. 1 1 9 11
subtotal 33 17 13 Total:63
Table 4.4 shows that decreasing impatience was also the most common pattern
for the two money sequences, but that between 25% and 35% of the subjects were
increasingly impatient. Impatience was less stable for money than for health, with 16
subjects switches from decreasing impatience in one sequence to increasing impatience
in the other. As for health, switching subjects were on average much more patient
than non-switching subjects and the switch from decreasing to increasing impatience
(and vice versa) could be explained by preference imprecision. However, there were
also some subjects for whom the switch was probably caused by errors. For example,
subject 56’s M1 and M2 sequences were (4,8,12,15) and (7,10,14,17). These responses
could be explained as follows. In sequence M1 he was always willing to wait 4 weeks,
but he made one error such that his final willingness to wait was only 3 weeks. In
sequence M2 he was always willing to wait 3 weeks, but, again, he made one error
such that his third willingness to wait was 4 weeks. The consequence of these two
small errors was that we classified him as increasingly impatient in sequence M1 and
as decreasingly impatient in sequence M2 even though he, probably, was constantly
impatient.
72
Figure 4.5: DI indices for the two health sequences
Figure 4.5 shows the DI indices for the two health sequences. Most points lie in
the first quadrant and the mean DI index was significantly positive for both sequences
(Wilcoxon test, both p < 0.01) consistent with decreasing impatience for health. The
DI indices of sequences H1 and H2 did not differ (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.54). The
correlation between the two DI indices was substantial (ρ = 0.62, p < 0.01), suggesting
that time preferences for health were relatively stable.
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Figure 4.6: DI indices for the two money sequences
Figure 4.6 shows the DI indices for the two money sequences. The means of both
sequences differed from 0 (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.04 for sequence 3 and p < 0.01 for
sequence 4). The DI indices did not differ (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.38), but their cor-
relation was only fair (ρ = 0.25,p = 0.05), suggesting that time preferences were less
stable for money than for health. Figure 4.7 shows the relation between the DI indices
for health and money. Panels A and D show that the indices for health and the first
money sequence were moderately correlated (ρ = 0.46 (p < 0.01) between sequences
H1 and M1; ρ = 0.48 (p < 0.01) between sequences H2 and M1). The correlations
between the two health sequences and sequence M2 were much lower and only slight to
fair (ρ = 0.27 (p = 0.04) between sequences H1 and M2; ρ = 0.11 (p = 0.37) between
sequences H2 and M2).
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Figure 4.7: DI indices for health versus money sequences
The DI indices indicated more decreasing impatience for health than for money.
However, this difference was only significant in the comparison with sequence M1 6.
The NS indices showed greater deviations from constant impatience for health than for
money in all comparisons 7. The finding that the DI and NS indices of sequences H2 and
M2 differed significantly from zero provided further evidence against quasi-hyperbolic
discounting.
6Wilcoxon tests, p = 0.02 in the comparison between sequences H1 and M1, p = 0.18 in the
comparison between H1 and M2, p = 0.03 in the comparison between sequences H2 and M1, and
p = 0.19 in the comparison between sequences H2 and M2.
7Wilcoxon tests, p = 0.02 in the comparison between sequences H1 and M1, p = 0.01 in the
comparison between H1 and M2, p = 0.06 in the comparison between sequences H2 and M1, and
p = 0.03 in the comparison between sequences H2 and M2.
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4.4.4 Hyperbolic factors
So far, the analysis has shown that our subjects violated constant and quasi-
hyperbolic discounting for both health and money. To gain additional insight into
the validity of the different discount models, we computed hyperbolic factors for each
subject. The hyperbolic factors are undefined when their denominator is negative,
which happens when a subject is extremely decreasingly impatient. Such behavior
cannot be accommodated by any of the hyperbolic alternatives for constant discount-
ing and requires more general discount models (Ebert and Prelec 2007, Bleichrodt et
al. 2009). It was rare in our data. For each subject, we computed 24 hyperbolic fac-
tors, 6 per sequence. In all sequences, less than 10% of the hyperbolic factors had a
negative denominator (5% in H1 and M1, 8% in H2 and M2). We could not reject the
null hypothesis of equal hyperbolic factors within each of the four sequences (Friedman
test, all p > 0.09). However, this result was sensitive to the exclusion of the 6 most
impatient subjects: without these subjects we could reject the null hypothesis of equal
hyperbolic factors in sequence H2 (but not in the other three sequences). While most
median hyperbolic factors equaled zero, all sequences contained at least one hyperbolic
factor that was significantly different from 0 at the 1% significance level. This con-
firms, once again, that constant discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting did not
hold. Finally, we could reject the prediction of power discounting that the hyperbolic
factors equal 1 (Wilcoxon test, all p < 0.01). Consequently, the only models that were
consistent with our data are Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) hyperbolic discounting
and Mazur’s (1987) proportional discounting, except ,perhaps, for sequence H2.
4.5 Discussion
The novelty of this paper is that we quantify deviations from constant discounting
across two domains: health and money. This quantification gives new insights into sub-
jects’ vulnerability to self-harming behavior and whether this vulnerability is domain-
specific. Our tests make no assumptions about utility and do not require intertemporal
separability. The main findings are as follows. First, our average subject deviated
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from constant discounting for both health and money and impatience decreased over
time. However, time preferences were heterogeneous and a substantial minority of our
subjects, between twenty-five and thirty-five percent, displayed increasing impatience.
For money, our findings on increasing impatience confirm previous evidence (e.g., Ab-
dellaoui et al., 2010; Sayman and Öncüler, 2009; Loewenstein, 1987; Takeuchi, 2011;
Chesson and Viscusi, 2003; Rubinstein, 2003). For health, only indirect evidence of
increasing impatience existed. The deviations from constant discounting were more
pronounced for health than for money, which indicates that people might be more vul-
nerable to self-control problems for health than for money. This finding also suggests
that intertemporal preferences are context-dependent and that findings for money out-
comes cannot be simply transferred to health. We may have found less decreasing
impatience for money due to market forces. As money is tradable on financial markets
and transferable across time, people’s discounting of money may have been disciplined
by the prevailing interest rates for money (Cubitt and Read, 2007). However, we also
found that time preferences were less stable for money than for health, which seems to
contradict the above conjecture.
Another possible reason for the difference between discounting for health and money
may be that our subjects were more familiar with decisions about money than decisions
about health. Yet, one would then, again, expect that time preferences would be
more stable for money than for health, in contrast to our observation. Moreover,
Chapman et al. (1999) found that familiarity with medical treatments did not increase
the similarity between time preferences for money and health.
Possibly, time preferences were more stable for health than for money because
subjects perceived their future health as more stable than their future income. For
delays up to 10 years, which we considered in our experiment, health is usually rather
stable and, moreover, we instructed subjects to assume that their baseline health would
remain constant to chronic back pain. However, we did not tell subjects that their
income would remain constant and, as they were students, substantial changes in their
income were likely in the near future (after graduation). Consequently, subjects may
have realized that their future evaluation of money would change. Our analysis assumed
that the evaluation of money would not change over time and this may have affected
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the estimations. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of time-dependence of
utility on discounting behavior see Gerber and Rohde (2010, 2015).
Our final contribution is to obtain new evidence on the descriptive validity of dis-
count models. Such evidence is still scarce, particularly for health. Hyperbolic dis-
counting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) and proportional discounting best described
intertemporal preferences, but it should be kept in mind that these two models cannot
accommodate the behavior of the increasingly impatient subjects. To explain increas-
ing impatience other discount functions are needed (Ebert and Prelec, 2007; Bleichrodt
et al., 2009). The widely-used quasi hyperbolic discounting model was rejected for both
money and health, casting doubt on the descriptive realism of studies that use this
model to derive predictions about behavior.
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Chapter 5
Cash in Hand, Crashes in Mind: Cash
Aggravates Probability Weighting
5.1 Introduction
Nowadays, consumers are indulged with many payment instruments: cash, checks,
debit cards, credit cards, online/mobile banking, Apple Pay, etc. Cash is no longer
the most common payment instrument in Europe or in the U.S. (Bagnall et al., 2014).
Non-cash payment instruments enable consumers to make payments without exchange
of cash notes, which substantially simplify the payment process. Non-cash payment
instruments obviously change how we pay. What is not as obvious but no less important
is, they also change how much we pay.
When payments are made in cash, consumers tend to spend less (Hirschman, 1979;
Feinberg, 1986). Even for hypothetical questions, consumers cued with credit card
logo in sight are willing to spend more and have shorter decision time (Feinberg, 1986;
Raghubir and Srivastava, 2008).The substantial gap between cash and non-cash pay-
ment cannot be fully explained by the convenience and potential money saving of
credit-card usage. A behavioral explanation is that the thoughts of payment can under-
mine the pleasures of consumption, and the psychological distance created by non-cash
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Ning Liu.
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payment could alleviate the pain of paying (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
To test the effects in incentivized transactions of high value, Prelec and Simester
(2001) conducted experiments comparing consumers’ willingness-to-pay for tickets to
sporting events with different payment instruments. Consistent with the literature,
consumers were willing to pay substantially more with credit card. The large credit
card premium (up to 100%) was implausible to be explained by liquidity constraints.
However, the effect seemed to depend on the characteristics of the products under val-
uation. In their second study, subjects were asked to value products of either certain
(a restaurant gift certificate) or unknown market value (tickets to a sold-out sporting
event, for which the value was unstated). The gap between cash and non-cash instru-
ments only existed for the products with unknown market value, but not for those with
certain market value.
If the effects of payment instruments are moderated by the feeling of uncertainty,
the question arises as to through which channel do the payment instruments work.
Prelec and Simester (2001) did not provide a theory explaining the presence of the
observed effect. In this chapter, we propose that payment instruments change valua-
tions of lotteries through shaping consumers’ risk attitudes. In particular, consumers’
probability weighting might be affected by payment instruments in two ways. On
the one hand, payment instruments could affect consumers’ attention allocation. As
Kahneman (2011) put it, “our mind has a useful capability to focus on whatever is
odd, different or unusual”. The attention paid to the colorful cash occupies cognitive
resources. Different notes and coins make it one-step harder to calculate EV of the
lottery. The depletion of cognitive resource reduces peopleąŕs reliance on the analytic,
calculating, and deliberative so called “System 2”, and rely more on the instinctive
“System 1”. Therefore people would be less sensitive to probability differences. On
the other hand, risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001) postulates that
responses to risky situations result in part from direct emotional influences, including
(negative) feelings such as worry, fear, or anxiety, and such feelings can be influenced by
how an outcome is presented (vividness). Compared with non-cash presented lotteries,
cash presented ones might trigger stronger anticipatory emotions and therefore make
people more pessimistic towards risk.
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We test the hypotheses above using a controlled laboratory experiment. We ask the
subjects to value lotteries with known probabilities under two treatments, one with cash
and the other with a non-cash instrument (number). We found that the valuations given
by subjects in the cash treatment were lower than those in the number treatment. We
use a binary rank-dependent utility (RDU) model to explain the certainty equivalents
(CEs) given under the two treatments. Since we used binary lotteries in the experiment,
many non-expected utility theories do not diverge (Gul, 1991; Luce and Fishburn, 1991;
Miyamoto, 1988), and therefore the results from binary RDU also apply to them. By
eliciting the parameters of the utility function and probability weighting function under
each treatment, we identified that the gap in CEs between the treatments was due to the
difference in probability weighting functions under the cash and non-cash treatments.
Subjects were less sensitive to changes in likelihood when valuing cash lotteries, however
there is no difference in pessimism.
5.2 Experimental design
Ninety-two students at Erasmus University Rotterdam participated in the exper-
iment (37% female). Each subject received a show-up fee of e5. On top of that,
each subject received additional payment (up to e30) determined by their choice in a
randomly drawn question answered in the experiment.
Subjects were assigned to one of the two treatments randomly, and were interviewed
individually by one of the two experimenters randomly determined, independent of the
treatment. In each session, the experimenter presented to the subject a series of lot-
teries, and recorded their valuation to each. To familiarize subjects with the tasks
and payment procedure, the instructions contained examples and trial problems. The
subjects could ask the experimenter clarification questions any time during the experi-
ment. To minimize the difference between the two experimenters, a strict protocol (see
Appendix) about what to tell subjects and how to answer their questions was adopted.
Subjects could work at their own speed. On average, it took them 45 minutes to
complete the experiment.
In both treatments, subjects were asked to give valuations to binary lotteries. We
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denote L = xpy (with x > y > 0). The lottery gave the subject the better outcome
x with probability p, and y otherwise. There were in total 12 such lotteries, varying
p, x and y (see Table 5.1). Such variation enables us to estimate the utility function
and the probability weighting function for each subject. The lotteries appeared in
individualized random orders.
Table 5.1: The lotteries used in the valuation task
p x y
1 0.05 20 5
2 0.05 30 10
3 0.1 10 5
4 0.25 20 5
5 0.25 30 10
6 0.5 10 5
7 0.5 20 5
8 0.75 20 5
9 0.75 30 10
10 0.9 10 5
11 0.95 20 5
12 0.95 30 10
We implemented the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure (Becker et al.,
1964) to elicit CEs for lotteries with compatible incentives. First, the lottery to be
implemented for real was randomly determined at the end of the experiment. Second,
the BDM procedure was conducted by drawing one number z between the lowest prize
(y) and the highest prize (x) of the chosen lottery. If z was larger than the subject’s
evaluation, the subject would receive z; otherwise, the subject would be paid by running
the lottery.
Figure 5.1 shows how the lotteries were presented to subjects in the two treatments.
The only difference between the two treatments is that in the number treatment, money
amounts were presented with the currency symbol and a number, as in most of the
experiments in decision studies; in the cash treatment, money amounts were presented
with real cash attached to the questionnaire without the number written down1.
1In the cash treatment, the same money amount could be presented in different ways. For instance,
e13 could be presented with two e5 notes plus three e1 coins, or with six e2 coins plus one e1 coin,
or other possible ways. We apply the rule that in the cash treatment, money amount is presented
with the fewest number of notes and coins. In this case, e13 is presented with one e10 note, one e2
coin and one e1 coin.
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Figure 5.1: Examples of lottery presentation
(a) Number Treatment
(b) Cash Treatment
Subjects were asked to either specify their evaluation to the lottery by writing down
the number in the number treatment, or put down the corresponding amount of cash
below the lottery in the cash treatment. Particularly, subjects in the cash treatment
were given a box with one e20 note, one e10 note, one e5 note, two e2 coins, one
e1 coin, one 50-cent coin, two 20-cent coins and one 10-cent coin in it, so that they
can make different combinations to present all possible evaluations (precision up to 10
cents) to lotteries, ranging from e41 to 0.
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5.3 Analysis
5.3.1 Decision-model-free analyses
We analyze the reported CEs without assuming any specific decision model. We use
a simple linear mixed-effects model, with fixed effects of treatments and task dummies
and with subject random effect. The certainty equivalent of lottery j given by subject
i is modeled as: CEij = βTreatmenti+ δj + ij, where i = 1, ..., 92, j = 1, ..., 12, and ij
is a normally distributed within-subject error term.
We also calculate Relative Risk Premium (RRP = EV−CE
EV
) for each valuation. The
positive, zero, and negative RRPs suggest risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk seeking
respectively. We model the RRPs with the same mixed effect model as the one for CE
above: RRPij = βTreatmenti + δj + ij, where i = 1, , 92, j = 1, , 12, and ij is a
normally distributed within-subject error term.
5.3.2 Binary RDU analysis
Under binary RDU, for a given binary lottery L = xpy (x > y ≥ 0), the CE shall
satisfy: CE = u−1(w(p)u(x) + (1 − w(p))u(y)) (Eq.5.1), where u is a utility function,
with u(0) = 0 and u′(x) > 0, describing how a monetary outcome x is subjectively
valued, and w is an increasing probability weighting function that assigns subjective
weight to probabilities, with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
Stott (2006) compared combinations of different utility functions and weighting
functions for choice data, and found that the combination of power utility function
(Wakker, 2008) and the compound invariance family (Prelec, 1998) the most predictive.
We therefore use the power utility function u(x) = xγ if γ > 0; lnx if γ = 0; −xγ if
γ < 0 (Eq.5.2), and Prelec’s compound invariant probability weighting function w(p) =
((exp(−(− ln p)a))b (0 < a < 1, b > 0) (Eq.5.3) to analyze our data. In particular, we
use Prelec’s two parameter probability weighting function that decomposes probability
weighting into likelihood-sensitivity and pessimism.
The parameter a is an index of likelihood-sensitivity, which points to a psycholog-
ical phenomenon which reflects “diminishing sensitivity” for probabilities. A smaller a
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indicates less distinction between different levels of likelihood. The parameter b is an
index of pessimism, and a bigger b indicates that the subject pays more attention to
the worst outcome.
Using maximum-likelihood estimation, we estimate Eq. 5.1 with the specific u and
w for each individual separately, and obtain parameters γ, a, and b for each individual.
We will compare the estimates to their benchmark and between the two treatments
using Wilcoxon tests.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Decision-model-free analyses
Table 5.2 shows the means (and standard deviations) of CEs for each lottery in
the two treatments. The EVs, winning probability of the larger outcome, the mean
differences between treatments normalized by EVs of the lotteries are also provided in
the table.
Table 5.2: CEs for each lottery
EV Probability Number Cash Difference
EV
1 5.5 0.1 6.20 (0.94) 6.05 (0.82) 2.72%
2 5.75 0.05 7.60 (2.66) 7.50 (2.34) 1%
3 7.5 0.5 7.60 (0.86) 7.39 (0.55) 3.87%
4 8.75 0.25 9.58 (2.75) 9.17 (2.33) 4.69%
5 9.5 0.9 8.55 (0.99) 8.40 (1.09) 1.58%
6 11 0.05 13.64 (3.01) 12.61 (2.26) 9.36%
7 12.5 0.5 12.50 (2.42) 12.30 (1.60) 1.60%
8 15 0.25 15.98 (2.76) 15.22 (2.71) 5.07%
9 16.25 0.75 15.50 (1.95) 14.65 (2.59) 5.23%
10 19.25 0.95 17.71 (1.58) 17.34 (2.31) 1.92%
11 25 0.75 23.10 (2.43) 20.46 (4.21) 10.56%
12 29 0.95 26.97 (2.25) 24.47 (4.94) 8.62%
It can be observed that CEs in the number treatment are larger than CEs in the
cash treatment for every lottery. As described in Section 5.3.1, we subject the CEs to
a linear mixed-effects model. The model shows that the CEs in the cash treatment are
on average 0.77 euro lower than those in the number treatment (p = 0.002).
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If look at the columns of EV and Difference
EV
, an increasing trend can be detected:
the normalized difference between two treatments is increasing with EV . This trend is
shown with a fitted line in Figure 5.2. Pearson correlation test also confirms this trend
(ρ = 0.62, p− value = 0.03).
Figure 5.2: Scatter plot of proportional difference sorted by EVs.
Figure 5.3 shows mean relative risk premium for lotteries with different probabili-
ties. The mean RRPs, sorted by the probability p of outcome x1, show a systematic
relationship between risk attitudes and probabilities of outcomes, which is also consis-
tent with the typical empirical findings: On average, people are risk seeking for small
probabilities, and risk averse for large probabilities.
We subject the RRPs to a linear mixed effects model, as described in Section 5.3.1.
The model shows that the cash treatment increases the RRP by 0.05 (p = 0.03).
5.4.2 Binary RDU analysis
Table 5.3 summarizes the results from the maximum likelihood estimation specified
in Section 5.3.2.
The results above show that, at the aggregate level, subjects in the number treat-
ment exhibit linear utility, likelihood insensitivity and no pessimism. The cash treat-
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Figure 5.3: RRP by the probabilities of the better outcome.
Table 5.3: Parameters from maximum likelihood estimation
Cash treatment Number treatment p-value
Utility Curvature γ median 1.09 1.07 0.97
mean 1.22 1.35
Likelihood Sensitivity a median 0.49*** 0.69*** 0.02
mean 0.55 0.67
Pessimism b median 1.00 1.01 0.46
mean 1.17 1.11
Number of Observations 46 46
Notes: Reported numbers are the medians and means of estimated coefficients in the cor-
responding treatment, followed by significance from one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test.
The benchmarks for the coefficients (γ, a, b) are 1.
The last column gives p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
*** indicates significance at 1% (two-sided test)
ment does not change the utility curvature, but changes the probability weighting. In
particular, subjects in the cash treatment are less sensitive to probability changes than
those in the number treatment.
In Figure 5.4, we plot the probability weighting curves (based on means of individual
parameters from maximum likelihood estimation) for the two treatments. The curve
of the cash treatment is more pronounced in its inverse S shape.
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Figure 5.4: Probability weighting curves of the two treatments.
5.5 Conclusion
It has been noticed in the literature that the gap between valuations made of cash
and non-cash instruments is more prominent for products of unknown value than for
those of clear market value. Using a simple experiment, we test how payment in-
struments influence valuation through affecting people’s risk attitudes, which can be
reflected by utility curvature and probability weighting.
The results show that valuators’ utility functions elicited for cash and non-cash
payment instruments do not differ from each other. The difference in valuations is
driven by probability weighting. Presenting lotteries with cash makes valuators less
sensitive to changes in likelihood, which leads to less variation in valuations of different
lotteries.
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5.6 Appendix. Experimenter’s protocol
1. Is this number how much I want to pay for / sell for this lottery?
“This is a valuation task, and you are asked to fill in how much is this lottery
worth to you. Our payment procedure is designed to guarantee that it is for your
best interest to fill in the exact valuation in your mind, which dominates both
overstating and understating this value.” (Specifically avoid mentioning “buy” or
“sell” in the explanation.)
2. In case the subject gives a valuation lower than the lower outcome in the lottery.
“Sorry to interrupt. You can surely put whatever amount you see proper as your
valuation. This is just a reminder, because here you put a valuation lower than
the lower possible outcome in the lottery, and I want to clarify the rules in case
there is any misunderstanding. Since we will only randomly draw a number from
the lower outcome and the higher outcome of a given lottery, in this case X and
Y (X<Y are the two outcomes of the lottery this subject is valuating), therefore
giving a valuation lower than the lower outcome of the lottery means that all
the random number we draw would be higher than your valuation and therefore
you will be paid that amount. In the extreme case, if we draw X, your valuation
indicates that you prefer to be paid X, rather than receiving this lottery that
gives you at least X. Is this what you prefer?”
3. In case the subject gives a valuation higher than the higher outcome in the lottery.
“Sorry to interrupt. You can surely put whatever amount you see proper as your
valuation. This is just a reminder, because here you put a valuation higher than
the higher possible outcome in the lottery, and I want to clarify the rules in case
there is any misunderstanding. Since we will only randomly draw a number from
the lower outcome and the higher outcome of a given lottery, in this case X and
Y (X<Y are the two outcomes of the lottery this subject is valuating), therefore
giving a valuation higher than the higher outcome of the lottery means that all
the random number we draw would be lower than your valuation and therefore
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you will receive the lottery. In the extreme case, if we draw Y, your valuation
indicates that rather than receiving Y, you prefer to receive the lottery that gives
you at most Y. Is this what you prefer?”
4. In the cash treatment, make sure the subject put all the notes and coins for
valuation back to the box after finishing each valuation.
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Chapter 6
Are Black Swans Really Ignored?
Re-examining Decisions from
Experience
6.1 Introduction
Studies of decisions from experience (henceforth, DFE) investigate decision situa-
tions in which people rely on personal experiences when facing uncertainty. Decision
makers often have no access to possible choice outcomes, let alone to the correspond-
ing probabilities. Instead, they make decisions based on the past observations in their
memory. DFE better captures real life decisions than traditional "Decisions from De-
scription" (henceforth, DFD) where payoffs and probabilities are fully specified, which
rarely happens the case in real life. In the usual sampling paradigm of DFE (Hertwig
et al., 2004), subjects learn about unknown payoff distributions by drawing samples
with replacement. With merely these cases in memory, they make their final decisions.
Since Hertwig et al. (2004), an intriguing discrepancy between the two decision
paradigms, which is called the DFE-DFD gap, has received plenty of attention. The
common view in the DFE literature is that rare and extreme events, so called "black
This chapter is based on the homonymous paper, co-authored with Ilke Aydogan.
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swans", are underweighted under the DFE paradigm whereas they are overweighted
under the DFD paradigm (for a review, see Hertwig and Erev (2009)). This implies
a complete reversal of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting that has been docu-
mented by many empirical studies under DFD (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto,
2000; Bruhin et al., 2010; Booij et al., 2010; Fehr-Duda et al., 2006; Gonzalez and Wu,
1999; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996).
The DFE literature has indicated that the DFE-DFD gap is a robust empirical
phenomenon. Although the under-sampling of rare events due to reliance on small
samples mostly explains the early findings on the gap (Hadar and Fox, 2009; Fox and
Hadar, 2006; Hertwig et al., 2004), later studies have shown that it does not provide
a complete account (Barron and Ursino, 2013; Camilleri and Newell, 2009; Hau et al.,
2010, 2008; Ungemach et al., 2009). Moreover, different attitudes towards risk (known
probabilities in DFD) and ambiguity (partially unknown probabilities in DFE) are
another cause of the gap (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Kemel and Travers, 2015). Despite
the robustness of the DFE-DFD gap, whether it can actually amount to a reversal - or
only an attenuation - of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting is still unclear in
the literature.
In addition to the sampling error and ambiguity, there are two extra confounds that
render the inferences about probability weighting problematic in DFE studies. The
first concerns an aggregation problem when there is a lack of control over the sampling
experience of subjects. Because of the random nature of the sampling process - where
the sampling is made with replacement and subjects decide when to stop sampling -
each subject relies on her own distinct subjective experiences while making her choices
in the sampling paradigm. Importantly, this heterogeneity at the individual level causes
potential distortions at the aggregate level due to averaging artifacts (see Estes,1956;
Estes,2002; Sidman,1952). We elaborate on this issue in the section of the DFE-DFD
Gap.
The second confound concerns is regarding the role of utilities in the investigation
of probability weighting. In proceeding studies of DFE, the underweighting of rare
outcomes is typically inferred from the preference of sure gains over EV-equivalent
lotteries with rare probability (for example, a preference of $1 for sure over a lottery
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with 10% chance of winning $10 and $0 otherwise). It seems that the prevalent risk
seeking for unlikely gains under DFD turns into an aversion under DFE (see also the
review of the DFE literature by Rakow and Newell 2010). However, it is important
to recognize that the aversion to unlikely gains may as well be due to concave utility
(possibly coupled with an unbiased probability weighting) as it may be due to an
underweighting of unlikely events.
This paper provides a reliable measurement of probability weighting under DFE
by resolving the aforementioned problems. First, we used Barron and Ursino’s (2013)
adjustment of the sampling paradigm to obtain a control over the sampling experience
of each individual subject. Specifically, all of our subjects were required to carry out
complete sampling from finite outcome distributions without replacement. Hence, they
acquired the precise sampling information that matched with the objective probabilities
without any sampling error or ambiguity1.
Next, rather than relying on indirect inferences, we measured probability weighting
by a rigorous two-stage methodology (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000;
Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Qiu and Steiger, 2010). In particular, controlling for the utility
curvature in the first stage, each choice in the second stage exactly revealed over-
weighting or underweighting of probabilities. Thus, our experimental setup enabled
us to identify the direction and the magnitude of the deviations from expected utility
(henceforth, EU), and hence find out what the exact DFE-DFD gap is.
6.2 Deviations from EU due to probability weighting
We restrict our attention to probability-contingent binary prospects in the gain
domain. A binary prospect of winning α with probability p and β otherwise is denoted
αpβ. Under rank dependent utility (henceforth RDU), for α < β < 0, αpβ is evaluated
by w(p)U(α) + (1 − w(p))U(β) where U is the utility function and w the probability
weighting function. Throughout, we assume binary RDU. Most other non-EU theories,
in particular both versions of Prospect Theory for gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
1Barron and Ursino (2013) also investigates the DFE-DFD gap using the same adjustment of the
sampling paradigm. A comparison of the current study with Barron and Ursino is provided in section
6.3.
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Tversky and Kahneman 1992), and Gul’s (1991) Disappointment Aversion Theory,
agree with the binary RDU in the evaluation of binary prospects (Observation 7.11.1.
in Wakker (2010), pp. 231). Hence, our analysis applies to all these theories.
RDU deviates from EU when w(.) is not the identity. Thus, the risk attitude of a
decision maker depend not only on the utility curvature as in EU but also on probability
weighting. The common finding with the DFD paradigm is an inverse S-shaped (first
concave and overweighting, then convex and underweighting) probability weighting
function (Figure 6.1)2. The steepness of the probability weighting function at the both
end points implies that the rare and extreme outcomes in general receive too much
decision weight. When a rare outcome with probability p is desirable, its impact given
by w(p) is overweighted because of the overweighting of small probabilities (w(p) > p).
This increases the attractiveness of the prospect, and enhances risk seeking. Similarly,
when a rare outcome with probability p is unfavorable, its impact, given by 1−w(1−p),
is overweighted because of the underweighting of large probabilities (w(1−p) < 1−p).
This decreases the attractiveness of the prospect, and enhances risk aversion.
Figure 6.1: Inverse S-shaped probability weighting function
2For evidence against inverst-S, see Qiu and Steiger (2011), van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) and
Krawczyk (2015).
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The pattern of inverse S-shaped probability weighting is commonly interpreted as
the reflection of both cognitive and motivational deviations from EU (Gonzalez and
Wu, 1999). On the one hand, the simultaneous overweighting and underweighting of
extreme probabilities implies insufficient sensitivity to intermediate probabilities. This
effect is called likelihood insensitivity, and points to cognitive limitations in discrimi-
nating different levels of uncertainty. On the other hand, underweighting of moderate
probabilities (such as, w(0.5) < 0.5) suggests a pessimistic attitude towards risk in the
major part of the probability domain. This effect points to motivational deviations
from EU.
6.3 The DFE-DFD gap
Hertwig and Erev (2009) considers three DFE paradigms: partial feedback, full
feedback, and sampling paradigms. The essential feature shared by all three DFE
paradigms is that subjects learn about unknown payoff structures by solely relying on
their past experiences. In the partial feedback paradigm, subjects learn about outcomes
and probabilities by making repeated choices, and receiving feedback about the real-
ized outcomes (Barron and Erev, 2003). In the full feedback paradigm, subjects also
learn about the forgone outcomes from the unchosen options (Yechiam and Busemeyer,
2006). The sampling paradigm involves a single, rather than repeated, choice preceded
by a purely exploratory and inconsequential sampling period in which subjects draw
outcomes from unknown payoff distributions with replacement, usually as many times
as they wish (Hertwig et al. 2004; Weber et al. 2004).
All three paradigms lead to similar behavioral patterns with an apparent under-
weighting of rare and extreme outcomes, which contradicts the common empirical find-
ings from DFD. However, although the empirical findings with all three paradigms are
alike, the two feedback paradigms are inherently different from the sampling paradigm
(for an empirical comparison of three DFE paradigms, see Camilleri and Newell 2011,
but also see the theoretical discussion of Gonzalez and Dutt 2011). In particular, re-
peated choices in the two feedback paradigms, as opposed to single decisions in the
sampling paradigm, induce long run pay-off considerations due to accumulating in-
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come. This is expected to lead to higher rates of expected value maximization in
repeated choices by the law of large numbers (Keren and Wagenaar, 1987; Lopes, 1982;
Tversky and Bar-Hillel, 1983). Furthermore, distinct psychological factors, such as re-
inforcement learning, and the hot stove effect (production of success), also play a role
in repeated decisions with feedback (March, 1996; Denrell and March, 2001). Erev and
Barron (2005) also reviews the effects which lead to deviations from expected value
maximization in repeated choice paradigms. The sampling paradigm, on the other
hand, is more comparable with the DFD paradigm as both involve single decisions.
Therefore, the intriguing gap between the sampling paradigm and DFD has received
most attention in the DFE literature. The current paper also focuses on the sampling
paradigm of DFE.
6.3.1 The information asymmetry account and the sampling
error
The main premise of the DFE-DFD gap is in which the way that the information
about uncertain prospects is acquired matters in decisions under uncertainty. In other
words, experience matters (Hau et al., 2008).
Fox and Hadar (2006) and Hadar and Fox (2009) argue that there is an important
caveat associated with this premise. DFE and DFD differ from each other not only
in terms of the way that the information is acquired but also in terms of the informa-
tion available to subjects. Indeed, whereas the precise probabilities and outcomes are
known in DFD, they remain partially unknown in DFE. This means that subjects in
DFE have to rely on their own subjective probability judgments based on the sampling
information they acquire. Importantly, subjective probabilities are prone to diverge
from objective probabilities due to potential errors either in the sampling process or in
subjective probability judgments. This generates an information asymmetry between
DFE and DFD. Hadar and Fox (2006) indicates that the underweighting of rare out-
comes observed by Hertwig et al. (2004) is almost entirely caused by the sampling
error as subjects often under-observe, or even never observe, the rare outcomes due to
reliance on small samples. On the other hand, judgment error and underestimation of
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rare outcomes are not found to be a significant sources of the gap.
Later studies test this information asymmetry account of the DFE-DFD gap by re-
ducing or completely eliminating the sampling error. Several papers demonstrated that
the gap is actually persistent when the subjects are obliged to draw large or even rep-
resentative samples from underlying probability distributions (Barron and Erev, 2003;
Camilleri and Newell, 2009; Hau et al., 2010, 2008; Ungemach et al., 2009). Moreover,
subjective probability judgments are usually found well calibrated although their corre-
lation with observed relative frequencies is imperfect (Camilleri and Newell, 2009; Hau
et al., 2008; Ungemach et al., 2009; Barron and Yechiam, 2009). These findings suggest
that the DFE-DFD gap is not just an artifact of information asymmetries between the
two cases but indeed a robust psychological phenomenon.
6.3.2 DFE and DFD: two different sources of uncertainty
Nevertheless, although the aforementioned studies solve the problem of sampling
error, the uncertainty about the outcome probabilities remains. This residual uncer-
tainty about probabilities makes DFE a case of ambiguity whereas DFD is a case of
risk. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Kemel and Travers (2015) shows that ambiguity
attitudes, i.e. the different attitudes towards known vs. unknown probabilities, also
play a role in the DFE-DFD gap. These studies investigate the role of ambiguity by
an intermediate design between DFE and DFD. In particular, while adhering to free
sampling, they also provide subjects with the list of outcomes that the prospects in-
volved to avoid the cases of ignorance3 (also see the incomplete information treatment
of Kemel and Travers, 2016). Both studies replicate the well-known gap but do not
find evidence against inverse S-shaped probability weighting under DFE. The absence
of underweighting in these studies may be explained by the mere presentation of out-
comes in their modified DFE design, which increases the salience of the rare outcomes
(Erev et al. 2008, see also the discussions in Abdellaoui et al. 2011 and Kemel and
Travers 2015).
3Ignorance refers to the lack of knowledge about possible outcomes here.
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6.3.3 Problem of aggregation in the sampling paradigm
Besides the sampling error and the uncertainty about outcome probabilities, there
is also a methodological difficulty in making inferences about the impact of experi-
ence in the sampling paradigm. This difficulty concerns the aggregation of individual
choices when there is substantial heterogeneity in sampling experiences of subjects. As
explained above, experienced probabilities differ from objective probabilities either due
to sampling error or due to judgment errors. As a result, each subject makes her choice
based on her own subjectively experienced probabilities. Notably, as the aggregation
of such individual choices amounts to taking the average of the weightings, rather than
the weighting of the average, of experienced probabilities, the concave-convex curva-
ture of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting function may lead to an erroneous
DFE-DFD gap.
To illustrate, the aforementioned point, assume that all subjects in DFE and DFD
have the same probability weighting function depicted in figure 6.2a, which is concave,
and overweight 10% probability of a rare and favorable outcome. For the sake of
the example, also assume that each subject in DFE draw only 5 times, in which half
of the subjects never observe the rare outcome, and the other half observe it once.
Therefore, assuming that the subjects do not commit a judgment error, the experienced
probabilities will be either 0% or 20%. In this case, aggregating choices over all subjects
as commonly done in the DFE literature amounts to averaging the weightings of 10%
and 20% rather than weighting the average 10%. This makes the aggregate choice
appear as if 10% is underweighted due to concavity whereas in reality it is overweighted
(see figure 6.2a).
The same effect, although probably less in size, also applies when there is no sam-
pling error but judgment error. Figure 6.2b illustrates the case where the subjects in
DFE accurately observe 10% probability, however, half of them underestimate it as
5% whereas the other half overestimate it as 15%. As a result, the aggregate choice
appears as if 10% is weighted less in DFE than in DFD (see figure 6.2b).
By the dual effect, convex probability weighting for large probabilities moves ag-
gregate choices in the direction of overweighting (see figures 6.2c and 6.2d). Together
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with the concavity around small probabilities, this implies a reversed or attenuated
inverse-S at the aggregate level as the DFE-DFD gap also suggests. This theoretical
conjecture is indeed indirectly supported by the findings of Rakow et al. (2008). In their
yoked design, each subject in the DFE treatment is matched with a subject in the DFD
treatment who receives the same sampling information in description format. Thus,
equating the heterogeneity of the sampling information across the two treatments, they
observe that the DFE-DFD gap is almost completely eliminated.
Our study measures the genuine weightings of probabilities by resolving the pos-
sible confounds generated by the aggregation problem. Accordingly, any variations in
experienced probabilities are eliminated by matching the sampling experience of each
individual subject with the objective probabilities. Subjects are obliged to acquire
complete knowledge of probability distributions by sampling all the possible outcomes
without replacement, leaving no room for sampling error or ambiguity. Thus, the DFE-
DFD comparison turns into a pure comparison of two cases of risk that differ only in
terms of information acquisition.
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Figure 6.2: Distortions due to aggregation
6.3.4 Underweighting or less overweighting?
Along with the aforementioned issues, the controversy about the DFE-DFD gap is
whether it can actually give rise to underweighting, or only less overweighting, of rare
outcomes. Rakow and Newell, 2010, pp.6) points out that although the gap implies
a relative difference in the weightings of rare outcomes, the evidence on the absolute
weightings (over - or under - weighting) is mixed. In particular, the gap often amounts
only to a discrepancy in risk attitudes (e.g. different degrees of risk seeking for small
probability gains) suggesting a less pronounced overweighting in DFE rather than an
absolute underweighting. As a matter of fact, even a reversal in risk attitudes (e.g. risk
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aversion for small probability gains in DFE as opposed to risk seeking in DFD) may
not be sufficient to conclude about the underweighting of rare outcomes under DFE as
a concave utility along with an unbiased weighting might also lead to risk aversion.
Our two stage methodology explained in the next section aims to uncover the abso-
lute weighting of probabilities by controlling the utilities. Thus, we clarify the essence
of the DFE-DFD gap.
6.4 Method
Our experimental procedure consists of two stages. In the first stage, the utility
function of each subject is elicited using the trade-off (TO) method of Wakker and
Deneffe (1996). The TO method is a well-established method that is commonly used
in studies investigating probability weighting (Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui et al. 2005;
Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000; Etchart-Vincent 2004, 2009; Qiu and Steiger 2011). The
method basically entails the elicitation of a standard sequence of outcomes that are
equally spaced in utility units. The elicitation procedure consists of a series of adaptive
indifference relations. For two fixed gauge outcomes G and g, and a selected starting
outcome xo with x0 > G > g, x1 > x0 is elicited such that the subject is indifferent
between prospects x1pg and x0pG. Then, x1 is used as an input to elicit x2 > x1 such
that the subject is indifferent between x2pg and x1pG. This procedure is repeated n
times in order to obtain the standard sequence (x0, , xn) with indifferences xi+1pg ∼
xipG for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Under RDU, these indifferences result in U(x1) − U(x0) =
U(x2) − U(x1) = ... = U(xn−1) − U(xn) (for the derivation, see Appendix A). A
remarkable feature of the TO method is that it elicits these equalities irrespective of
what the probability weighting is. Therefore, it is robust against most distortions due to
non-expected utility maximization. Once the standard sequence of outcomes has been
obtained, we obtain the utility function of each individual by parametrically estimating
the power specification U(x) = xα with α > 0 after scaling of xis as xi = xi−x0xn−x0 . We
use parametric estimation in order to smooth out errors, and better capture the utility
curvature. The parameter α is calculated using an ordinary least squares regression
without intercept, log(U(x)) = α log(x) +  where  ∼ N(0, σ2). In the second stage of
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our procedure, we measure probability weighting using several binary choice questions.
The questions are constructed based on the subject-specific outcome sequences obtained
from the first stage. Subjects choose between risky prospect xkqxj and a sure outcome
sq, where xk and xj are two distinct elements of the elicited outcome sequence with
xk > xj, and sq is equal to the certainty equivalent of xkqxj, i.e.
sq = U
−1[qU(xk) + (1− q)U(xj)] (6.1)
That is, sq would be equivalent to xkqxj if the subject with the given utility did not
weigh probabilities. Hence by construction, the following logical equivalences hold for
given preference relations under RDU.
xkqxj ≺ sq ⇔ w(q) < q (underweighting) (6.2)
xkqxj ∼ sq ⇔ w(q) = q (EU) (6.3)
xkqxj  sq ⇔ w(q) > q (overweighting) (6.4)
Because we do not allow indifference in our experiment, each individual choice will
reveal either overweighting or underweighting of probability q. Our method makes the
deviations from EU observable at the aggregate level. For instance, an overweight-
ing of q can be detected when the majority of subjects choose the risky xkqxj as in
Equation6.4.
Barron and Ursino (2013) also investigates the DFE-DFD gap under risk (their
experiment 1) similar to our study by using a different two-stage experimental proce-
dure. Their procedure replicates the well-known DFE-DFD gap. However, it does not
make inferences about the over- or under- weighting of rare outcomes under DFE and
DFD4. Different from Barron and Ursino (2013), our two stage procedure measures the
weightings of probabilities under DFE and DFD. Thus, we can draw inferences about
actual over - or under - weightings, as well as the DFE-DFD gap.
4Their first stage obtains an indifference relation under DFD which implies w(1 − q)U(X) =
w(q)U($40), where the probability q is either 0.1 or 0.2, depending on the treatment, and X was
elicited. Their second stage looks at deviations from this indifference under DFE and DFD. Their
findings indicate deviations only under DFE, suggesting less weighting of q and/or more weighting of
(1− q) under DFE, i.e. w(1− q)U(X) > w(q)U($40), consistent with the DFE-DFD gap.
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6.5 The Experiment
6.5.1 Subjects and incentives
The experiment was performed at the ESE-EconLab at Erasmus University in 5
group sessions. Subjects were 89 Erasmus University students from various academic
disciplines (average age 23 years, 40 female). All subjects were recruited from the pool
of subjects who had never participated in any economic experiment in our lab before,
to avoid experienced subjects in TO method. We paid each subject a e5 participation
fee. In addition, at the end of each session, we randomly selected two subjects who
could play out one of their randomly drawn choices for real. The ten subjects who
played for real received e60.70 on average. Over the whole experiment, the average
payment per subject was e12.37.
6.5.2 Procedure
The experiment was run on computers. Subjects were separated by wooden panels
to minimize interaction. To prevent the impact of variations in memory limitations, all
subjects were provided with paper and pen in case they wished to take notes. Before
they started with the main parts of the experiment, they read the general instructions
with detailed information about the payment procedure, the user interface, and the
type of questions they would face. The subjects could ask questions at any time during
the experiment. The experiment consisted of two successive stages without a break in
between. Each stage started with its corresponding instructions, and several training
questions to familiarize subjects with the stimuli. Each session took 45 minutes on
average, including the payment phase after the experiment.
6.5.3 Stimuli
6.5.3.1 Stage 1: measuring utility
In the first stage of the experiment, a standard sequence of outcomes was elicited
using the TO method. We measured x1, x2, x3, x4,and x5 from the following five indif-
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ferences, with p = 0.33, G = 17, g = 9, and x0 = 24:
24pG ∼ x1pg, x1pG ∼ x2pg, x2pG ∼ x3pg, x3pG ∼ x4pg, x4pG ∼ x5pg.
Our choice of the fixed parameters p,G, g, x0 was fine-tuned based on a pilot session so
that the elicitation yields a well-spaced outcome sequence for reliable certainty equiv-
alent values of sq in Equation6.1.
Indifferences were obtained by a bisection method requiring 7 iterations for each xi.
In addition, the last iteration of one randomly chosen xi was repeated at the end of the
stage 1, in order to test the reliability of the indifferences. Hence, subjects answered
a total of 36 questions in this part. The bisection iteration procedure is described in
Appendix B. The prospects were presented on screen as in Figure 6.3.
In this part, risk was generated by two ten-faced dice each generating one digit of
a random number from 00 to 99. The outcome of prospects depended on the result of
two dice physically rolled by subjects in case the question was played for real at the
end of the experiment.
Figure 6.3: Choice situation in the TO part
6.5.3.2 Stage 2: DFD and DFE
Before the start of the second part, each subject was randomly assigned to one of the
two treatments: DFE or DFD. Subjects in both treatments answered 7 subject-specific
binary choice questions. Each question entailed a choice between a risky prospect x5qx1
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and the safe prospect sq as described in section 6.4. Note that both x1 and x5 were
endogenously determined, and varied between subjects (the reason for using x1, rather
than x0 as the minimum outcome in the risky prospects is explained in the section of
Discussion). Values of sq were always rounded to the nearest integer.
The seven probabilities used for the investigation of probability weighting were
0.05,0.10,0,20,0.50,0.80,0.90 and 0.95. Within each treatment, the orders of the seven
questions were counterbalanced. The position of the risky prospect and the safe
prospect were also randomized in each question.
Prospects were represented by Ellsberg-type urns containing 20 balls with different
monetary values attached to them. This means that all the aforementioned probabilities
were fractions of 20; i.e. 5% is 1 out of 20, 10% is 2 out of 20, etc. The two treatments
differed from each other in terms of how the contents of the urns were learnt. Figure
6.4 shows a screen shot of a choice situation for DFD.
Figure 6.4: Choice situation in DFD
Subjects in the DFE treatment were initially given no information about the con-
tents of the urns except the total number of balls. They could only learn about the
outcome compositions of the urns by sampling each and every ball one-by-one without
replacement, and observing the monetary values attached. Figure 6.5 shows a screen
shot of the sampling phase in the DFE treatment. Subjects sampled balls from urns
by clicking "Sample left" or "Sample right" on the screen. Each time, the monetary
outcome attached to the ball sampled was shown to the subject for 1.5 seconds, and
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then disappeared. Subject could sample in their own speed, in whichever order they
preferred, and switch as many times as they wanted, but they could only proceed to
the choice stage after sampling all the balls in both urns.
Figure 6.5: Choice situation in DFE
The Figure 6.6 shows the screen shot of the choice stage in DFE. In case a question
in this part was drawn for the payment at the end of the experiment, the experimenters
physically created the relevant urn seen on the screen by filling an opaque urn with 20
ping-pong balls painted to dark blue or light blue, each associated with the payoffs in
question (see Figure 6.4). Then, the subject drew a ball from the urn, which determined
her payoffs.
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Figure 6.6: Choice stage in DFE
Subjects in the DFD treatment faced 21 extra questions following the main set of
7 questions to equalize the length of the two treatments. These extra questions were
for another research project.
6.6 Results
6.6.1 Reliability and consistency of utility elicitation
In the TO part, each subject repeated one choice faced in one of the five elicitations.
The repeated choice was randomly selected among the last steps of the iterations.
Because the subjects were very close to indifference at the last step, this was the
strongest test of consistency. Subjects made the same choice in 70.8% of the cases.
Reversal rates up to one third are common in the literature (Stott, 2006; Wakker et al.,
1994). Especially, if the closeness to indifference is taken into account, our reversal rates
are satisfactory. Among the reversed cases, repeated indifferences were higher than the
original indifference values in 42.3% of the times, which did not indicate any systematic
pattern (p=0.5572, two-sided binomial). Overall, repeated indifference values did not
differ from original elicitations (p=0.44, Wilcoxon Sign-rank).
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In our data, one subject reached the possible lower bound of xi’s in all 5 cases.
Consequently, her standard sequence was not well spaced enough for the estimations
of sq with Equation 6.1 (x5 − x1 = 8). 5 We excluded this subject from the following
analysis. The analysis with this subject included does not alter our conclusions. The
same problem was not observed with any other subject.
6.6.2 Utility functions
Table 6.1 gives the descriptive statistics for the elicited outcome sequence. The
parameter α of the power utility u(x) = xα was estimated at the individual level by
ordinary least squares regression. The average R2 over all individual utility estimations
was 0.985 which indicated that our estimations fit the data well.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the elicited outcome sequence (N=88)
Mean S.Dev Min Median Max
x0 24.00 0.00 24.00 24.00 24.00
x1 60.36 23.48 30.00 58.00 118.00
x2 90.36 42.58 36.00 80.00 212.00
x3 125.23 65.89 46.00 102.00 306.00
x4 164.18 91.13 52.00 134.00 400.00
x5 204.14 116.25 58.00 160.00 494.00
α 1.05 0.36 0.41 0.99 2.65
The summary statistics for the mean and median α are reported in the last row of
Table 6.1. The aggregate data did not deviate from linearity (p=0.92, Wilcoxon sign-
rank). Although the mean α suggested slight convexity, this was due to the outliers
in our data. Three subjects exhibited extreme convexity with α > 2, and the Skew-
ness/Kurtosis test rejected the normality of the distribution of α’s (p=0.00). Utilities
did not differ across the two treatments (p=0.84, Wilcoxon rank-sum).
Our data suggested slightly more evidence for concavity at the individual level.
5Specifically, the resulted estimations, s0.05 = x1 and s0.95 = x5, made the preference for x50.05x1
over s0.05 and the preference for s0.95 over x50.95x1 trivial because of the domination of the safe or
the risky prospect.
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Based on the α parameters that were significantly different than 1, 30 subjects (15 in
DFE, and 15 in DFD) exhibited concavity (α < 1), and 23 subjects (12 in DFE, and 11
in DFD) exhibited convexity (α > 1). The proportions of concave and convex utilities
did not differ from each other (p=0.41, two-sided binomial).
6.6.3 Probability weighting: DFE vs. DFD
6.6.3.1 Aggregate data
Figure 6.7 shows the proportion of choices in the directions of overweighting and
underweighting according to Equation 6.2 and Equation 6.4 in the Method section.
The aggregate choices in the DFD treatment conformed to the inverse-S pattern
with strong pessimism: the moderate and the high probabilities (q ≥ 0.50) were
strongly underweighted (p=0.00 for all, two-sided binomial), and the small probability
0.05 was overweighted although this was only marginally significant (p=0.07, two-sided
binomial). The deviations from EU in 0.10 and in 0.20 were not significant (p=0.23 and
p=0.37 respectively, two-sided binomial). The deviation for these probabilities was in
the direction of overweighting for 0.10 and in the direction of underweighting for 0.20.
Turning to the DFE-DFD comparison, the apparent DFE-DFD gap was mainly
observed at the extreme probabilities. It was significant at 0.95 (p=0.02, χ2); and
marginally significant at 0.10, and at 0.90 (p=0.06 and p=0.07 respectively, χ2). The
gap was always in the expected direction reducing both the overweighting of the small
probabilities and the underweighting of the large probabilities. The gap at the other
extreme probability 0.05 was not significant ( p=0.20, χ2), although the trend sugested
reduced overweighting in DFE. There was also no apparent DFE-DFD gap at the
probabilities in the middle range, 0.20 ≤ q ≤ 0.80 (p=0.35, p=0.92 and p=0.37 for
q=0.20,0.50, and 0.80 respectively, χ2).
Our aggregate results did not provide evidence for the reversal of inverse-S in the
DFE treatment. Overall, strong underweighting prevailed at the probabilities in the
middle range 0.20 ≤ q ≤ 0.80 (p=0.00, p=0.03 and p=0.03 for q=0.20,0.50, and 0.8
respectively, two-sided binomial) but there were no significant deviations from unbiased
weighting at the extreme probabilities p ≤ 0.10 and p ≥ 0.90 (p=1, p=0.22, p=0.13,
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and p=0.22 for q=0.05,0.10,0.90, and 0.95 respectively, two-sided binomial). Notably,
the trend of the gap suggested a reversal in the direction of underweighting in DFE
only at 0.10 but this was insignificant.
The findings reported here can be interpreted in terms of likelihood insensitivity
and pessimism as discussed before. On the one hand, simultaneous attenuation of both
the overweighting of small probabilities and the underweighting of large probabilities
suggests increased likelihood sensitivity in the DFE treatment. On the other hand,
absence of the significant DFE-DFD gap in the middle range of the probability domain
indicates persistent pessimism in both treatments.
Figure 6.7: The DFD-DFE gap
Notes: ms: the gap is marginally significant (at level 10%); *: the gap is significant at level 5%;
**: the gap is significant at level 1%; -/+ms: the underweighting/overweighting is marginally
significant (at level 10%); -/+*: the underweighting/overweighting is significant at level 5%;
-/+**: the underweighting/overweighting is significant at level 1%
An estimation of Prelec’s (1998) two-parameter weighting function supports these
observations. In this specification given by w(p) = exp (−β(− ln q)α), where 0 < α < 1
and β > 0, α captures the sensitivity towards changes in probabilities, and β captures
the degree of pessimism. We estimated the parameters α and β by the method of
maximum likelihood. The probability of choosing the risky prospect was calculated
using the stochastic choice rule of Luce (1959) which was also used by Holt and Laury
(2002): Pr(choosing risky option)=
RDU
1/µ
risky
RDU
1/µ
risky+RDU
1/µ
safe
, where µ is the noise parameter.
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In our case, the rule reduces to Pr(choosing risky option)= w(q)
1/µ
w(q)1/µ+q1/µ
6, which implies
random choice when w(q) = q, consistent with Equation 6.3 in section 6.4 in the
Method section. The standard errors were corrected for clustering at subject level.
The estimation results are in Figure 6.8. The probability weighting function for
DFD confirms the inverse-S shape as it is steep at both ends, and flat in the middle.
The major part of the curve is under the diagonal, signifying strong pessimism. The
extreme insensitivity implied by this curve (α=0.081) is discussed in the beginning of
the Discussion section.
Figure 6.8: Estimation of Prelec’s probability weighting function
The impact of the non-linear probability weighting observed under the DFD treat-
ment is reduced but not reversed under the DFE treatment. Indicating the enhanced
likelihood sensitivity in DFE, the sensitivity parameter α differs between the two treat-
ments, although the effect is marginal (p=0.06). Notably, the probability weighting
function for DFE also exhibits the inverse S-shape although it is less pronounced than
the DFD curve. The small probabilities below 0.05 are still overweighted, and the
6Normalizing U(x1)=0, and U(x5)=1; RDUrisky = w(q)U(x5) + (1 − w(q))U(x1) = w(q), and
RDUsafe = U(xq) = q by construction
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large probabilities are still underweighted but to a lesser extent. The two weighting
functions do not differ in terms of pessimism (p=0.34) as both curves lie mostly under
the diagonal with almost the same elevation. The same results are replicated using the
estimations of Goldstein and Einhorn’s (1987) probability weighting functions. The
results with this specification are in Appendix C.
6.6.4 Individual data
We also investigated the shape of probability weighting functions at the individual
level. The weighting of probabilities near 0 and 1 are best suited for the investigation
of patterns in probability weighting because they reveal the most crucial deviations
from linear weighting. We used two separate pairs of probabilities, 0.05 - 0.90, and
0.10 - 0.90, for the individual level analysis. For the pair of 0.05 - 0.95, a probability
weighting function was classified as inverse S-shaped if it exhibits w(0.05) > 0.05 and
w(0.95) < 0.95, as S-shaped if it exhibits w(0.05) < 0.05 and w(0.95) > 0.95, as
optimistic if it exhibits w(0.05) > 0.05 and w(0.95) > 0.95, and as pessimistic if it
exhibits w(0.05) < 0.05 and w(0.95) < 0.95. These inequalities are inferred from
Equation 6.2 and Equation 6.4 in the Method section. The classification with the pair
of 0.10-0.90 was similar.
Our results are in Figure 6.9. For both probability pairs, inverse S was found to be
the dominant pattern in the DFD treatment. The inverse S pattern was significantly
more frequent than the second most common pessimistic pattern based on the 0.05 -
0.95 pair (p=0.05, two sided binomial). The difference was marginally significant based
on the 0.10 - 0.90 pair (p=0.07, two sided binomial).
Compared to the DFD treatment, the inverse S pattern was found less frequently
(p=0.05 for the pair 0.05 - 0.95, and p=0.02 for the pair 0.10 - 0.90, χ2 ), and the S
pattern was found more frequently in the DFE treatment, although the latter effect
was marginal (p=0.07 for the pair 0.05 - 0.95, and p=0.09 for the pair 0.10 - 0.90, χ2).
Despite the differences between the two treatments, there was no clearly dominating
pattern in the DFE treatment. Inverse S was still the most common pattern based
on the classification with the 0.05 - 0.95 pair, however its proportion did not differ
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from the proportion of the second most common pessimistic pattern (p=0.56, two sided
binomial) or from the proportion of the S-shaped pattern (p=0.33, two sided binomial).
Based on the classification with the 0.10 - 0.90 pair, the most common pattern in the
DFE treatment was pessimism, however its proportion was not significantly different
from the proportion of the inverse-S pattern or from the proportion of the S-pattern
(p=1 and p=0.85 respectively, two sided binomial). Hence, the results of the individual
analysis confirm those of the aggregate analysis.
Figure 6.9: Classification of probability weighting functions
6.7 Discussion
6.7.1 Experiment design and results
Our adjustment of the sampling paradigm with complete sampling of outcomes
aimed to solve confounds generated by sampling error, ambiguity, and the aggregation
problem. Camilleri and Newell (2011) argues that forcing subjects to draw large sam-
ples can result in other biases due to memory limitations and inattention. One example
is the recency effect according to which the more recently observed outcomes are more
readily available in memory, and therefore they receive more weight in decisions (Her-
twig et al. 2004). To avoid problems related to inattention and memory limitations,
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we provided our subjects with paper and pen in case they wanted to keep track of the
outcomes during the sampling stage in DFE. We observed that more than half of our
subjects in DFE treatment took notes. Moreover, our data did not suggest any recency
effect. Hence, our results were less like to be driven by other cognitive biases such as
limited memory and the recency effect7.
Our two-stage experimental design controlled for utilities to isolate the impact
of probability weighting on risky choices. The utilities were measured under DFD
paradigm, and the probability weightings were measured under DFD and DFE. Thus,
it is implicit in our design that sampling experience has an impact on probability do-
main but not on utilities. This conjecture was supported under the sampling paradigm,
where the subjects make single decisions without accumulating income (but also see
Ludvig and Spetch (2011) with the partial feedback paradigm). In particular, Abdel-
laoui et al. (2011) measured the utilities under the sampling paradigm of DFE and
DFD separately, and did not detect any difference across them.
The first stage of our experiment measured the utilities by using the TO method.
One concern about the TO method for utility elicitation is its being adaptive. This
means that later stimuli are determined by previous choices. Although the interdepen-
dence between different choices may be a problem for the incentive compatibility in
theory, all previous studies that investigated the problem found that it does not occur
for the TO method (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt et al., 2010; Qiu and Steiger, 2010;
Schunk and Betsch, 2006; van de Kuilen and Wakker, 2006). Hence, in the terminology
of Bardsley et al. (2010), this is only a concern for theoretical incentive compatibility
but not for behavioral incentive compatibility (pp. 265). Note that the iterative pro-
cedure used for the elicitation of each outcome xi in the TO method was also adaptive.
Our bisection procedure made it difficult for our subjects to understand the adaptive
nature of our method by including filler questions in the iteration process. Our data
did not show any evidence of strategic choices. See appendix B for details.
The second stage measured probability weightings by using binary choice questions
constructed based on the estimated power utilities in the first stage. In these questions,
7Observing the rare outcome(s) in the first or in the second half of the sequence did not have
an impact on risky choices (p=0.84, p=0.87, p=0.85, and p=0.15 for q=0.05,0.10,0.90, and 0.95
respectively, chi2).
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we used the elicited x1 as the minimum outcome of the risky prospects to avoid problems
related to the extreme behavior of power utility near its origin (Wakker 2008), i.e. x0 in
our design. In particular, for α<1, the slope of the power utility converges to infinity as
x tends to the origin. This implies extreme risk aversion near the origin. Similarly, α>1
implies extreme risk seeking near the origin. The replication of the common inverse S
pattern in our DFD treatment confirmed the robustness of our design.
Our results indicated likelihood insensitivity in both DFD and DFE but to a sig-
nificantly lesser degree in the latter. The extreme likelihood insensitivity implied by
the estimations of Prelec’s weighting function in the DFD treatment might be surpris-
ing, regarding more moderate estimations reported in the previous studies under DFD.
However, one important difference of our study is the use of binary choices - rather
than certainty equivalents - as the method of elicitation measurement. As the accounts
of the preference reversal phenomenon suggest, the prominence of the probability do-
main in binary choices might possibly enhance the impact of nonlinear probability
weighting on risk (see Tversky et al. (1990) on prominence hypothesisthe prominence
hypothesis). Our individual level analysis confirmed the extreme insensitivity in the
DFD treatment as 55% and 53% of the probability weighting functions were classified
as inverse S-shaped based on 0.05 - 0.95 and 0.10 - 0.90 pairs respectively, whereas only
9% and 13% were classified as S-shaped (likelihood sensitivity).
Our finding of the attenuated inverse S in DFE was also supported by a very recent
study (Kopsacheilis, 2016, April). In the same vein as our study, Kopsacheilis controlled
for the sampling error, ambiguity and memory effects by introducing several treatments
manipulating these effects. His findings mainly indicated that the sampling error was
the most important component of the gap, and the error-free sampling experience led
only to a reduced overweighting of small probabilities.
Our findings did not suggest any gap for moderate probabilities. Although out-
comes with moderate probabilities, such as 50%, have received little attention in DFE
literature, Lejarraga et al. (2016) and Ludvig and Spetch (2011) suggested that the
DFE-DFD gap also extends beyond rare outcomes. There are two possible explanations
for this discrepancy between the findings. First, while our study uses an adjustment of
the sampling paradigm, Lejarraga et al. (2016) uses the original sampling paradigm in
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which the experienced probabilities is uncertain (ambiguity), and Ludvig and Spetch
(2011) uses the feedback paradigm in which subjects accumulate income. Second, while
our study focuses on the gain domain, Ludvig and Spetch (2011) considers both the
gain and the loss domain, and Lejarraga et al. (2016) considers the loss domain (in
monetary and health outcomes). The true impact of experience in the loss domain
awaits future research.
6.7.2 The impact of learning experience
The experimental results show that the deviations from rational weighting of prob-
abilities, which are often associated with cognitive limitations, diminish as the proba-
bilistic information is acquired through sequential sampling. Learning from experience
enhances sensitivity to changes in relative frequencies but does not impact the attrac-
tiveness of risky prospects. The apparent discrepancy between the two informationally-
identical treatments signifies the distinct mental processing and representation of the
event frequencies in memory resulted from experience. See Estes (1976) for a detailed
cognitive account of probability learning.
Our findings support Plott’s (1996) Discovered Preference Hypothesis which states
that so-called anomalies in human choice diminish or even disappear with proper learn-
ing opportunities and familiarity with decision problems. Accordingly, learning from
experience may correct the misunderstandings about the meaning of probabilities, and
enhance EU maximization. Plott’s account is also supported by other previous stud-
ies investigating the impact of learning experience. Gottlieb et al. (2007), Hilbig and
Glockner (2011), and Humphrey (2006) report reduced probability weighting with dif-
ferent variants of the sampling paradigm. Erev et al. (2015, problems 1,2,7 to 11),
Jessup et al. (2008), van de Kuilen and Wakker (2006) and van de Kuilen (2007) re-
port significant convergence to EU maximization under risk in repeated choice settings,
when immediate feedback after each choice is available but not when it is unavailable.
This suggests the distinct impact of experience in repeated choice settings. Another
recent study by Yechiam et al. (2015) reports strong underweighting of very small prob-
abilities, such as 0.005, over 200 to 400 trials with accumulating payoffs. The results of
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Yechiam et al. call for further investigation of the weightings of very small probabilities
when the income effect is absent, and the utilities are controlled for.
6.8 Conclusion
This paper clarifies the controversy about the DFE-DFD gap. Our strictly con-
trolled sampling paradigm isolates the impact of the sampling experience from other
confoundings, and the rigorous two stage design reveals the exact weighting of proba-
bilities under DFE. The experimental findings support the DFE-DFD gap. However,
the gap does not amount to a reversal of the inverse S-shaped probability weighting
and there is no actual underweighting of rare and extreme outcomes in DFE. Our
findings illustrate the importance of the learning experience in reducing irrationalities.
Decisions from experience do not reverse an irrationality into another irrationality but
rather the cognitive impairment of likelihood insensitivity. Black swans are not ignored
under DFE.
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6.9 Appendix A. Derivation of the standard sequence
of outcomes in TO method
Under RDU, indifferences xi+1pg ∼ xipG imply w(p)U(xi+1) + (1 − w(p))U(g) =
w(p)U(xi)+(1−w(p))U(G). A rearrangement of this equation shows U(xi+1)−U(xi) =
1−w(p)
w(p)
[U(G)− U(g)] for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Because the right hand side of the equation
is fixed by the design, the indifferences result in U(x1) − U(x0) = U(x2) − U(x1) =
... = U(xn−1)− U(xn).
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6.10 Appendix B. Bisection Procedure
The iteration process serves to measure x1, x2, x3, x4, and x5 from the following
indifferences, with p = 0.33, G = 17, g = 9, x0 = 24:
x0pG ∼ x1pg, x1pG ∼ x2pg, x2pG ∼ x3pg, x3pG ∼ x4pg, x4pG ∼ x5pg.
For each xi, it took five choice questions to reach the indifference point. Subjects always
chose between two prospects: xipg and xi−1pG for i = 1, ..., 5. The procedure was as
follows.
1. The initial value of xi was determined as xi−1 + 4(G− g) = xi−1 + 32.
2. xi was increased by a given step size when xi−1pG was chosen over xipg, and
decreased when xipg was chosen over xi−1pG as long as xi > xi−1. In case xi ≤
xi−1, xi was increased in order to ensure outcome monotonicity.
3. The initial step was 4(G− g) = 32. The step sizes were halved after each choice.
4. The indifference point was reached after five choices.
5. The largest possible value of xi was xi−1 + 32 + 32 + 16 + 8 + 4 + 2 = xi−1 + 94.
6. The smallest possible value of xi was xi−1 + 32− 32 + 16− 8− 4− 2 = xi−1 + 2.
The fourth term on the left hand side (+16) ensured the outcome monotonicity
(see point 2).
One concern for the TO method and the bisection iteration process is the incentive
compatibility due to the adaptive design. A subject who is fully aware of the adaptive
design can strategically drive the value xi upwards by pretending to be extremely risk
averse in the bisection questions. In this way, he or she can increase the expected values
of prospects in the subsequent questions for the elicitation ofxi+1. To make it more
difficult for our subjects to fully grasp the process, we included two filler questions in
the iteration process of each xi. The two filler choices were after the first and the third
choice questions for every xi. In these questions, xi was changed in the direction that
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is opposite to the changes described in point 2 above. These questions had no further
impact on the flow of the procedure.
Our data did not suggest any strategic behavior. While an awareness of the adaptive
design from the outset is fairly unlikely, learning during the experiment would lead to
increasing distances between xis. This means that a systematic learning of the strategic
choice during the experiment would give us larger distances between x5 and x4 than
between x1 and x0. On the contrary, the median distances in our data were 26 and 34
respectively, and did not differ significantly (p=0.54, Wilcoxon sign-rank).
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6.11 Appendix C: Estimations of Goldstein and Ein-
horn’s (1987) probability weighting function
Goldstein and Einhorn’s (1987) probability weighting function is given by w(q) =
δqγ
(δqγ+(1−q)γ . In this specification γ captures the likelihood insensitivity whereas δ is the
anti-pessimism parameter. The sensitivity parameter γ differed between treatments,
although the effect was marginally significant (p = 0.07). The anti-pessimism param-
eter δ did not differ between the treatments (p = 0.19). These results are shown in
figure 6.10 below.
Figure 6.10: Estimation of G & E’s probability weighting function
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Chapter 7
General Conclusions
This dissertation investigated the stability, and adaptivity of decision making over
time and under risk. Chapter 2 and 3 addressed the stability side of preference. Chapter
2 introduced a new method to measure the temporal discounting of money. Chapter 3
tested reduction invariance, and confirmed the validity of Prelec’s compound-invariant
probability weighting function. The latter three chapters continues to explore the
adaptivity side where preferences were studied in different outcomes and under various
context. Chapter 4 compared the deviations from constant discounting for health
and money. Chapter 5 elicited people’s risk attitudes when using cash vs. numbers.
Chapter 6 discussed if people have completely different risk preferences when making
decisions from experience, and provided new evidence to the DFD-DFE gap literature.
Chapter 2 presented the direct method to measure discounting that requires no
knowledge of utility. Although all existing measurements of money discounting have
used discrete outcomes, real-life decisions often involve flow outcomes, such as salary
payments, pension saving plans, and mortgage debt repayments. In such contexts,
the DM is more natural than discrete methods. However, we have to admit that our
method is less useful for single-outcome decisions.
Chapter 3 followed up on Luce (2001) and performed an experimental test of reduc-
tion invariance. Our data support reduction invariance, indicating that the behavioral
foundation of Prelec’s probability weighting function is empirically valid. A byproduct
of our study is that we also tested reduction of compound gambles, which is often
considered a feature of rational choice. Most subjects (60%) behaved according to it.
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The subjects who deviated from it, deviated overwhelmingly in the direction of higher
certainty equivalents for the compound gambles than for the corresponding simple
gambles.
Chapter 4 assessed the severity of departures from constant impatience, and quanti-
fied the degree of decreasing impatience for both health and money. Knowing whether
time preferences are the same for those two domains is important for both research and
policy. The results indicated that most subjects deviated from constant impatience and
were decreasingly impatient for both health and money. Subjects deviated more from
constant discounting for health than for money. This domain-dependence of discount-
ing suggests that evidence on time preferences for money has only limited validity for
health. It is inappropriate for policy makers to adopt the time preference in money
to health directly. In addition, about one third of our subjects exhibited increasing
impatience, suggesting that their willingness to wait decreases as time passes by. This
finding cannot be incorporated by most discounting models.
Chapter 5 demonstrated the malleability of risk attitudes. By just presenting lottery
outcomes in cash instead of numbers, people deviated more from rationality: they were
less sensitive towards changes in likelihoods. Our results also provided an explanation
for credit card premium: when the value of the product is uncertain, customers using
cash are more risk averse than those who use credit cards, therefore holding credit
cards makes you spend more.
Chapter 6 investigated the DFE-DFD gap by solving four problems in the previous
studies: sampling error due to limited search, ambiguity due to sampling with replace-
ment, distorted aggregate level results caused by aggregation of heterogeneous indi-
vidual data, and unclear probability weighting because of unadjusted utility functions.
Our results did not support the prevalent finding of S-shape probability weighting in
DFE research: the gap still existed while it did not amount to a reversal of the inverse
S-shaped probability weighting. We signify the importance of the learning experience
in the reduction of irrationalities. Decision from experience did not reverse an irra-
tionality into another irrationality but rather reduced the irrationality in the presence
of proper learning experience that was free from sampling biases and ambiguity.
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Samenvatting|Summary in Dutch
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de stabiliteit, en adaptiviteit van besluitvorming over
tijd en onder risico. Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 behandelen hoe stabiel voorkeuren zijn. Hoofd-
stuk 2 introduceert een nieuwe methode om geld te verdisconteren over tijd. Hoofdstuk
3 bestudeert reduction invariance, en bevestigt de validiteit van Prelec’s compound-
invariant kans-gewogen functie. Ten slotte, de laatste drie hoofdstukken onderzoeken
hoe adaptief voorkeuren zijn voor verschillende uitkomsten en verschillende context.
Hoofdstuk 4 vergelijkt afwijkingen van constante verdiscontering in het geval van
gezondheid en geld. Hoofdstuk 5 laat het risicogedrag zien wanneer men moeten kiezen
tussen getallen of geld. Hoofstuk 6 onderzoekt dat men compleet verschillende risicov-
oorkeuren heeft wanneer een besluit gebaseerd is op eigen ervaring, en geeft nieuwe
inzichten ten op zichtte van de leemte in de DFD-DFE literatuur.
Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert een directe methode om te verdisconteren waarbij geen ken-
nis over utiliteiten nodig is. Alhoewel alle bestaande methoden om geld te verdiscon-
teren discrete uitkomsten gebruiken hebben de meeste werkelijke besluiten betrekking
op stroom uitkomsten, zoals salarisbetalingen, pensioensparen, en hypotheek betalin-
gen. In deze context is het gebruik van de directe methode logischer dan discrete meth-
oden. Echter, onze methode is minder bruikbaar voor beslissingen met één uitkomst.
Hoofdstuk 3 vervolgt het werk van Luce (2001) en test reduction invariance door
middel van een experiment. Onze data bevestigt reduction invariance, wat aangeeft
dat het gedragsfundament van Prele’s compound-invariant kans-gewogen functie em-
pirisch valide is. Een additioneel resultaat van ons onderzoek is dat we tevens de
afname van samengestelde weddenschappen hebben onderzocht, wat vaak wordt gezien
als een kenmerk van rationele keuze. De meeste proefpersonen (60%) gedroegen zich
hierna. De proefpersonen die hiervan afweken, weken voornamelijk af in de richting
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van equivalenten met hogere zekerheid in samengestelde weddenschappen dan voor de
overeenkomstige simpele weddenschappen.
Hoofdstuk 4 evalueert de consequenties wanneer wordt afgeweken van de aanname
dat ongeduld constant blijft, en kwantificeert het afnemende ongeduld op het gebied
van zowel gezondheid en geld. Het is belangrijk om te weten dat voorkeuren gelijk
blijven over tijd voor zowel onderzoek als voor beleidsregels. De resultaten laten
zien dat de meeste proefpersonen afweken van de aanname van constant ongeduld
en waren meer ongeduldig over tijd voor zowel gezondheid en geld. Proefpersonen
weken meer af van constante ongeduld voor gezondheid dan in plaats van geld. Deze
domein afhankelijkheid voor verdiscontering laat zien dat tijdsvoorkeuren voor geld
weinig validiteit hebben voor gezondheid. Het is daarom niet geschikt voor beleids-
makers om tijdsvoorkeuren in geld te gebruiken voor gezondheid. Tevens, ongeveer één
derde van onze proefpersonen toonde zich toenemend ongeduldig, wat duidt dat de
bereidwilligheid afneemt over tijd. Deze uitkomsten kunnen niet worden meegenomen
in de meeste verdiscontering modellen.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft hoe risicogedrag kan veranderen. Door loterij uitkomsten uit
te drukken in geld in plaats van getallen worden mensen minder rationeel: ze waren
minder sensitief voor veranderingen in de aannemelijkheidsfunctie. Onze resultaten
verklaren tevens de kredietkaart premium: wanneer de waarde van een product onbek-
end is, zijn klanten met contant geld meer risico-avers dan klanten met een kredietkaart,
dit resulteert dat het hebben van een kredietkaart tot meer uitgaven leidt.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de DFD-DFE leemte door het oplossen van vier prob-
lemen uit vorige studies: steekproeffouten door gelimiteerd onderzoek, ambiguïteit
door trekkingen met teruglegging, vertekende geaggregeerde resultaten vanwege het
aggregeren van individuele heterogene data, en onduidelijke kans-wegingen vanwege
onaangepaste utiliteitsfuncties. Onze resultaten wijzen niet op de algemene uitkomst
van een kans-gewogen S-functie in de DFE literatuur: de leemte bestaat nog steeds
maar onze resultaten duiden niet naar de directie van een kans-gewogen inverse S-
functie. We onderstrepen het belang van leerervaringen om irrationaliteit te vermin-
deren. Besluitvorming gebaseerd op ervaring leidt niet dat een irrationaliteit in een
andere irrationaliteit veranderd, maar eerder vermindert irrationaliteit in het geval van
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goede leerervaring die vrij was van onzuivere metingen en ambiguïteit.
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